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ABSTRACT
A LOCATION DECISION: THE BOSTON COMMON PARKING GARAGE
by Gary L. Greeson
Submitted to the Department of City and Regional Planning,
M.I.T., on May 21, 1965, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning.
As a case study of the planning expert's role in poli-
tical decision-making, this thesis examines the history
of a major public investment decision--the Boston Common
Parking Garage. Planners, in opposing the Garage, played
a strictly technical role which was inappropriate to the
competitive political environment in which they were oper-
ating. And there was some evidence to indicate that the
planner working for a governmental agency will favor public
action over private action.
The planners were not co-opted to plead the case of
any political head or pressure group interest; and studies
provided by planners were not used to draw pressure away
from the Mayor. It was necessary, however, for the Mayor
to compromise planning advice in order to satisfy political
pressures. The planners were systematically biased in favor
of tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice.
And the planners' rationality, public welfare, and synoptic
orientations led to conflict with the Mayor's orientation
which was incremental and disjointed. The City Council, how-
ever, found the planners' opinions to be useful in performing
a watchdog function.
The city planners wanted stability in capital program-
ming--a desire which conflicted with the politician's view
of municipal policy. And the planners, in forecasting user
demand, favored smaller dispersed garages over a large facil-
ity of equal cost (the Boston Common Garage). Finally, the
study revealed that planners acting as private citizens could
exert significant influence in the political arena.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: JOHN FRIEDMANN
TITLE: Associate Professor of Regional Planning
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A. INTROUCTION
City planning as a legitimate arm of city gov-
ernment has gained wide acceptance; and its ideological
basis is no longer seriously challenged. 1 Federal hous-
ing and highway programs have given impetus to the plan-
ning movement which is seen as a logical approach to the
solution of city problems.2 Yet planning has failed to
influence irportant decisions in many cities; that master
plans often "gather dust" is a common observation.
Recent attacks upon the city planning profession
have centered around this lack of influence, this seeming
irrelevance of planning efforts to decisions affecting
1. John Friedmann, Planning As A Vocation. Manuscript.
1961. P. 39.
2. See Lloyd Rodwin, "The Roles of the Planner in the
Comunity" in Charles R. Adrian, ed., Social Science
and conmmity Action, The Institute For Community
Development and Services, Michigan State University,
1960, p. 49.
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the physical environment of the city.3 Planners have
been accused of neglecting social issues such as racial
segregation, chided for ignoring the political facts of
city life, and criticized for using simplistic rational-
ity models.4  The planner is pictured as a frustrated
bureaucrat, operating in an environment that he does not
fully understand.
One response to the no-influence problem has
been a preoccupation by some leading planners with the
organizational position of the planning function in city
government. When the second edition of Walker's The Plan-
ning Function in Urban Government came out in 1950, it
touched off a debate which still continues among planners.
The debate has been between those who want to retain the
independent, citizen planning commission and those who
favor some other organizational arrangement--usually some
form of staff arrangement attached to the executive office.5
In fact Walker argued that the independent planning com-
3. For example, see Edward C. Banfield, Political Influ-
anca. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
4. Ibid. See also Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield,
Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest. New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955; and Edward C. Banfield
and James 0. Wilson, City Politics. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 1963.
5. For bibliography of the debate, see Peter H. Nash and
Dennis Durden, "A Task-Force Approach to Replace the
Planning Board," Journal of the American Institute of
Planner, XXX (February, 1964), pp. 10-25.
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mission was not adequate for executing the planning func-
tion; he said that "planning is one of the staff functions
6
and should be attached to the executive office." His
arguments set the stage for the long debate which has
turned to the planning commission as the whipping post
for planning failure. Neither Walker's data (1937-38)
nor the subsequent arguments calling for abolition of the
planning commission, however, are convincing. As one ex-
perienced planner put it: "if the political leaders of
the community, in the council and in the mayor's or man-
ager's office, understand and want city planning, the com-
mission form will work better....If they don't, neither
7
set-up will work." A recent study has substantiated this
argument; Rabinowitz found that the organization for plan-
ning was an insignificant variable between "effective"
and "ineffective" planning communities.
What then is the solution to planners' lack of
influence? How should the planner conduct his practice in
6 Robert A. Walker, The Planninjg Function in Urban Govern-
ma-nt. Second Edition. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1950. P. 334.
7. John T. Howard, "In Defense of Planning Commissions,"
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XVII
(Spring, 1951), p. 91.
8. Francine Fischer Rabinowitz, _QliJtc
on the Role of the Expert in Urban Development, un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass.,
1965, p. 35.
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a given city at a given time? There are no easy answers.
Very few studies have concentrated upon the role of the
planning expert in political decision-making.9 There
have been, however, a number of studies of broader com-
munity decision-making. Their focus has been the role
of various influential people in determining community
action. The city planner has been relatively ignored in
these studies; at best they only suggest hypotheses about
the city planner's role. Despite these studies, there is
still some confusion as to who actually governs city pol-
itics. Is it a group of elites or a pluralistic system
of influentials? Is political power continuously main-
tained or do different people or groups come to the fore
when different issues arise? The evidence is opinionated;
and the methods biased.10 Hunter found a "power pyramid"
of about 40 persons in Atlanta, by asking selected influ-
9. The few that have include: Ibid; Walker, 2p. cit.
Robert T. Daland and John A. Parker, "Roles of the
Planner in Urban Development," in Chapin and Weiss,
eds., Urban Growth Dynamics. New York: Wiley, 1962,
pp. 188-225; and Alan Altshuler, The Process of Plan-
ning in Two American Cities, unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Chicago, 1961.
10. Lawrence D. Mann, "Studies In Community Decision-
Making," Journal of the American Institute of Planners,
XXX (February, 1964), pp. 58-65.
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11
entials about who actually made the important decisions.
He was lambasted for using a method which predetermined
his findings.1 2 But more recent studies, rejecting the
elitist theory, have done the same in finding a pluralis-
tic model of influence. By studying a number of "diver-
gent issues," they have also predetermined their findings.1 3
By following this literature, the planner can get perhaps
a better idea of how "influence" or the "decision process"
works. But the implications for his own behavior are not
clear.
The present study is proposed to help clarify
the planning expert's role in community decision-making.
Since the city planner's domain is the physical environ-
ment of the city and his avowed expertise is in guiding
physical development of the city,14 a major public invest-
ment and location decision has been chosen for a case study
11. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1953.
12. See Nelson W. Polsby, Cmmunity Power Structure and
Political Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963.
13. For example, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1961; and the review of Dahl
by H.W. Bruck, JIournal of the American Institute of
£Lannerg, XXVIII (November, 1962), pp. 293-295.
14. See Melvin M. Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and
Social Responsibility: Toward An AIP Consensus On
The Profession's Roles and Purposes," Journal of the
Anerican Institute of Planners, XXIX (November, 1963)
pp. 232-241.
of the planner's role. The Boston Common Parking Garage
history was one which brought the city planner into con-
tact with major political forces; and it was in many ways
typical of the debate which surrounds public investment
15
decisions. The city planners took a definite stand in
the debate--but eventually lost. By examining their role
in such an issue (especially one in which their position
met with eventual failure), some of the important factors
contributing to the planner's influence or lack of influ-
ence can be identified. This study should help to provide
a better understanding of the planner's position and con-
tribution--an understanding which could increase his in-
fluence, so that the planning function can be satisfac-
torily performed.
B. MET1OD
The Boston Common Parking Garage location deci-
sion was chosen for an historical study because the case
is now old enough to permit the expression of candid opin-
ions by the actors (although not guaranteed). There were
many data sources, including: reports, hearings, minutes,
newspaper articles, parking studies, court cases, and open-
15. In Boston, similar debate has arisen over highway
locations, selection of a NASA Research Center site,
urban renewal and other public investment decisions.
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end interviews. These were used to determine facts, namely
the actual events and actual behavior of the people in-
volved. The interviews also provided opinions, attitudes,
reasons for behavior, and information about relationships
between actors. Major emphasis is placed upon the actual
events or behavior. One major drawback of the historical
study is that the memories of the persons interviewed may
be questionable; to counteract this, all interviews were
checked to see that they jibed with the actual events.
The word planner includes those persons profes-
sionally trained or professionally recognized as qualified
city planners. It does not include typists, draftsmen,
data collectors, or other similar personnel who may work
for a planning agency. It does not include members of
the lay planning commission. Both those professional plan-
ners working as part of a governmental agency and those
serving as consultants to the agency are included as part
of the study. In testing hypotheses about the planner's
role, the hypotheses are meant to apply to both the civil-
servant and consulting planners serving the City of Boston.
Other city planners who entered the debate over the Garage
acted as private parties and were not subject to the nor-
mal constraints of a city planner working for a govern-
mental agency. As it turned out, these "other" city plan-
-8-
ners played an important role in the Garage's history; and
a section will be devoted to this role of the city planner
as a private citizen. The hypotheses to be tested, however,
are meant to apply only to planners responsible to and
paid by Boston's city government.
To ascertain the planner's role, a number of
hypotheses were formulated from a reading of works per-
taining to the role of the planning expert. The concept
of "role" is generally delineated by this set of hypothe-
ses. These hypotheses include: the planner's norms and
biases which affect his behavior; the relationship between
the planner and other actors; and the planner's position
within the limitations of the decision-making or social
structure in which he works.16 A role is only partially
chosen; in many ways it is predetermined for the planner
by institutional, personality, and other constraints. On
the other hand, a role is not fixed. Consensus about a
person's role in a position may not exist. Thus the role
player may, to some degree, define his role through a kind
16. This formulation conforms roughly with the concept
of "role" in Neal Gross, Ward Mason and A. McEachern,
Ezplorao in Rais_ Studies of the School
p tendncy Role. New York: Wiley, 1958, and
with the sociological interpretation of "role" as a
set of norms or activities between persons (see Fred-
etick L. Bates, "Position, Role, and Status: A Re-
formulation of Concepts," ocAlF 1956, Vol.
34, pp. 313-321.)
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of learning process whereby expectations among actors are
developed.17
C. HYOTHESES
The first hypothesis is derived from a recently
completed work by Rabinowitz.l8 She concluded that the
effectiveness of planning depends upon the planner's ad-
justment to the pattern of political decision-making in
a community.19 This same idea was suggested by Daland
and Parker; they found that acceptance of planning tended
to increase where planning was seen as being "useful" by
the actors in policy-making.20 Rabinowitz stated this
ability to be "useful" in a more general form. She saw
a number of roles that planners could assume in different
political environments. In a study of six New Jersey
cities, she compared the effectiveness of planning with
the appropriateness of the planner's role to the politi-
cal system. She compromised the elitist and pluralistic
views of city politics into a political conldnuum of four
major bands:21
(1) The Cohesive System--a collection of elites
17. Gross et al, ibid., p. 321.
18. Rabinowitz, op. Cit.
19. Ibid. P. 153.
20. Daland and Parker, p. cit., p. 221.
21. Rabinowitz, p pp. 76-101.
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exercise continuing power in directing important community
decisions.
(2) The Executive System--"the leadership group
is....comprised mainly of public officials and prominent
private individuals representing major interests in the
city. The chief executive (the Mayor) stands at the cen-
ter of concentric circles of power."
(3) The Competitive System--"more than one leader-
ship clique exists in competition with others on a contin-
uing basis."
(4) The Fragmented System-"no visible leader-
ship group or groups exist."
The possible roles for the planner were: 22
(1) The Technical Role--the planner serves as
a technician giving advice to a civic elite which is re-
sponsible for policy-making and implementation.
(2) The Broker Role--the planner evolves stra-
tegies for maintaining coalitions of competing interests;
he negotiates acceptable solutions.
(3) The Mobilizer Role--the planner mobilizes
resources and disparate interests to create energy in
support of change.
The way for the planner to be "useful" or "effec-
22. Thi d. Chapter IV.
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tive" then is to find an appropriate role within a politi-
cal system. In some systems, certain planners' roles will
be ineffective. For example, she found the Technician
role to be inadequate in the Competitive System. By clas-
sifying Boston's political system and the role played by
Boston's city planners, another test of her thesis will
be completed (and available for comparison with her results).
Hypothesis 1: The planner's influence will be
determinedJ bythe appropriateness of his role to the de-
cision-making environment in which he operates.
The second hypothesis is taken from a reading
of Johr and Singer's The Role of the Economist As Official
Adviser. Based on their experience as expert advisers, they
found that economists tended to exaggerate the importance
of government measures and to treat private activities
23
as a "negligible quantity." Simon has pointed to the
fact that organizational identity may cause a decision
bias on the part of an individual. 24 He defined "identi-
fication" as "the process whereby the individual substi-
tutes organization objectives for his own aims as the
23. W. A. Johr and H. W. Singer, The Role of the Econo-
mist As Official Adviser, London: Allen & Unwin,
1995. P. 41.
24. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior. 2nd Edi-
tion. New York: MacMillan, 1957.
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value indices which determine his organizational decisions.
One negative aspect of identification is that it may cause
the individual to be prejudiced in his evaluation--espe-
cially in evaluating factors outside the organization's
realm. Simon listed these reasons for organizational iden-
26
tification:
(1) Personal Interest in Organizational Success
(2) Transfer of Private-Management Psychology
(3) Focus of Attention
For the city planner, this kind of identifica-
tion could mean a number of things: for example, he
might be impatient with private efforts to solve a prob-
lem; he might misinterpret private intentions--possibly
regarding them as detrimental to the public welfare; he
might favor governmental control or operation to private--
in order to boost local government power; he might seek
to increase his own salary or prestige by getting new
functions for his department; he might resent private
development decisions which did not have his approval;
or he might simply reject or neglect the private point
of view. In short, he would tend to favor government ac-
tion over private action.
25. Ibid. P,. 218.
26. Ibid. Pp. 209-212.
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Hypothesis 2: City planners, working for gov-
ernment agencies, will tend to favor government measures
over private action.
Several hypotheses can be drawn from Banfield's
Political Influence, a study of six controversies in Chi-
cago. Banfield was critical of planners for their inabil-
ity to exert real influence.27 From a reading of this
work, I have drawn the following hypotheses to be tested:
Hypothesis 3: In a location dispute, the plan-
ning expert serves as a co-opted intermediary to plead
the case of a particular interest or to legitimate the
plans of a political head.28
Hypothesis 3a: Studiesprovided by planners are
used to draw pressure or criticism away from the politi-
cal head.29
Hypothesis 4: A political decision-maker can
never make an important location decision on coMpletely
rational grounds. To some degree, he will have to be ar-
bitrary or nonlogical. Thus expert opinion will have to
27. Banfield, op. cit., Chapter 12.
28. See ibid., pp. 268, 277.
29. See ibid., p. 278.
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be compromised. 3 0
Hypothesis 5: The planning expert will be sys-
tematiclly biased in his choice of positions in a loca-
tion dispute. He will favor tangible, quantifiable, pre-
dictable criteria of choice.31
Other works have suggested that the city plan-
ner's approach to problem-solving and his conception of
the public welfare are unrealistic in the political arena.
Braybrooke and Lindblom have challenged certain ideals
of policy evaluation, many of which would seem to char-
acterize city planning methods.32 These include such
ideals as: (1) using simple priorities or criteria to
evaluate policy; (2) using a rational-deductive ideal which
they claim represents an ideal of science transferred to
the field of values; (3) specifying a welfare function
whereby public welfare is quantifiably expressed; and
(4) attempting comprehensive analysis in the solution of
problems (the synoptic ideal). These strategies of prob-
lem solving, they say, are doomed to be inadequate because
30. See i . p. 329.
31. See ibid., p. 330.
32. David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy
o Decision: Policy Evaluation As A Social Process.
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, Chapters
1-6.
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of multiple, changing, and conflicting values, and because
of man's limited problem-solving capacities. The inade-
quacy and costliness of information, the closeness of
fact and value, the open political system, the need for
strategic sequences of analytical moves, and the diversity
of policy-problem forms are additional reasons why the
above ideals will not work in the real world. Braybrooke
and Lindblom propose a strategy of "disjointed incremen-
talism" in the evaluation of policy. This supposedly
would be better because it is consistent with actual be-
havior. Without challenging this proposal, the implica-
tion is that city planners will be using methods and ideas
which for the most part will be unsatisfactory, and that
these ideals will conflict33 with the realities of the
policy-making environment.
Meyerson and Banfield, in a case study of Chi-
cago's public housing efforts, also noted that city plan-
ners had a kind of "code" by which the public interest
could be determined. They stated:
....The code specified that racial amity and
33. The word conflict, as used here and in the proposed
hypotheses, does not necessarily mean that an open
fight will develop. It may be taken as merely a
collision of ideas. The result of the conflict may
be a winner and a loser; or it may simply be neglec-
ted planning advice.
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integration were very much to be desired, that
waste was to be avoided, and that all citizens
should be treated with rigorous impartiality,
that the values of family, home, and good citi-
zenship should be furthered by public effort,
and that public officials should subordinate
neighborhood and private interests (particular-
ly, personal ones) to the public interest.
Most important, the code specified that
the ends in it were to be regarded as more im-
portant than any conflicting ends that indivi-
duals might have. 34
This code and the conceptions it employed were consider-
ably different from "the public interest" of the politi-
cians.35
The hypothesis derived from the above works is:
Hypothesis 6: The rationality, public welfare,
and synoptic orientations of city planners will cause them
to conflict with political leaders whose orientations are
more incremental and disjointed.
A related hypothesis was suggested in Brown and
Gilbert's case study of municipal investment in Philadel-
phia.36 They also noted a difference in viewpoint between
city planners and politicians--in this case due to the
preference of city planners for abstract programming cri-
34. Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., p. 301.
35. Ibid., p. 300.
36. W. H. Brown, Jr. and C. E. Gilbert, Planning Munici-
pai investment: A Case Study of Philadelphia. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961, p.
196.
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teria. This is similar to the rationality orientation
above but suggests a more specific reason for conflict.
Also their work placed the center of conflict between the
Council and the planners.
Hypothesis 6a: The preference of city planners
for abstract programming criteria will place them at log-
gerheads with the City Council which has a more "politi-
cal" perspective.
Brown and Gilbert also found that the planner's
desire for stability in capital programming conflicted
with other views of municipal policy.37 By stability,
they meant the desire to maintain a coordinated, six-year
program with no abrupt changes. They suggested that the
political reality of short-run public pressure tended to
be ignored by planners. A seventh hypothesis then is:
Hypothesis 7: The planner will want stability
in capital programming. This will lead to conflict with
the politician's view of municipal policy which favors
government responsiveness to short-run public wants.
Finally, Brown and Gilbert hypothesized that
planners, in order to avoid errors in economic and behav-
ioral forecasting tended to recommend a number of small
37. Ibid., p. 208.
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projects over large projects of equal cost. And on this
account, the planners agreed with the politicians and
administrators who were bargaining for influence.38 Their
evidence, however, that city planners favored small projects
because of methodological defenses was scanty. They had
to distinguish between those projects which were identi-
fied with city planning (e.g. urban renewal) and which
were pushed on a large-scale project basis to attract
support, and those projects which were merely subject to
planner's advice and which had no particular identification
with planning (e.g. police stations). Yet the hypothesis
may have merit. By testing whether the methods of pro-
jecting or quantifiably measuring the need for facilities
actually led to a number of small projects, an important
city planning prejudice may be discovered. In fact, it
may suggest that other alternatives are precluded at this
level of policy recommendation.
Hypothesis 8: When giving locational advice
for projects propose d byothergvernment agencies if
proposed projects require user-demand forecasting, city
p2lanners will favor a lare number of small projects over
a small number of large projects of e.qua cost.
In the next chapter, the history of the Boston
38. Ibidp., p. 288.
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Common Parking Garage will be examined to see if the hypo-
theses are valid. The history will be grouped under head-
ings which might be called "steps in a decision process."
The third chapter will cover any conclusions drawn from
the study. And a fourth chapter will include general im-
plications of the findings and suggestions for further
research.
To facilitate the reader's reference to the study's
hypotheses, they are summarized below:
Summaa of Hyotheses
1. The planner's influence will be determined by the ap-
propriateness of his role to the decision-making en-
vironment in which he operates.
2. City planners, working for government agencies, will
tend to favor government measures over private action.
3. In a location dispute, the planning expert serves as
a co-opted intermediary to plead the case of a parti-
cular interest or to legitimate the plans of a poli-
tical head.
a. Studies provided by planners are used to draw
pressure or criticism away from the political
head.
4. A political decision-maker can never make an important
location decision on completely rational grounds. To
some degree, he will have to be arbitrary or nonlogi-
cal. Thus expert opinion will have to be compromised.
5. The planning expert will be systematically biased in
his choice of positions in a location dispute. He
will favor tangible, quantifiable, predictable cri-
teria of choice.
6. The rationality, public welfare, and synoptic orien-
-20-
tations of city planners will cause them to conflict
with political leaders whose orientations are more
incremental and disjointed.
a. The preference of city planners for abstract pro-
gramming criteria will place them at loggerheads
with the City Council which has a more "political"
perspective.
7. The planner will want stability in capital programming.
This will lead to conflict with the politician's view
of municipal policy which favors government responsive-
ness to short-run public wants.
8. When giving locational advice for projects proposed
by other governmental agencies, if the proposed pro-
jects require user-demand forecasting, city planners
will favor a large number of small projects over a
small number of large projects of equal cost.
-21-
II. A HISTORY OF T H E D E C I SI O N
A. THE IDEA IS PROPOSED
The Common Garage proposal has coincided with
the long history of parking problems in the central busi-
ness district. The Garage was first proposed in 1919,
when Councilor Henry E. Hagan asked that the Board of
Street Commissioners consider the practicality of a'park-
ing station" under the Boston Common.39 The Board rejected
the idea as being too costly. In 1923, J. Edmund Brown
of Chelsea presented the Chamber of Commerce a plan for
building a "motorcave" under part of the Boston Common.
He said it would hold 3,000 cars and could be built for
$3 million. That same year, Councilor Hagan again proposed
a "parking station" under the Common. He told the City
Council: "Automobiles are with us and they are with us
39. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, March 3, 1919.
-22-
to stay, and we must provide some parking accommodations
for them."40 The following year, Warren E. Locke, a Bos-
ton engineer, presented to a legislative committee detailed
plans for such an underground garage. In 1926, City Coun-
cilor John J. Heffernan requested that the Board of Street
Commissioners prepare cost estimates for such a garage.
The Board merely resubmitted its skeptical 1919 opinion.
Then in 1928, the idea was taken up by the City's Public
Works Commission. At a hearing in City Hall Annex in No-
vember, 1928, the vice president of the Beacon Hill Civic
Association-a civic group destined to battle the propos-
al throughout its history--"voiced strong protest."41
Nothing came of these early proposals, except
to bring the idea forward. It remained dormant during the
first years of the Depression. But it was not long before
the parking problem once again gained attention. In 1933,
a private citizen proposed that the city lease land where
old buildings were, tear them down, and operate municipal
parking spaces at a reasonable charge. The City Planning
Board rejected the idea, considering it "inadvisable to
compete with private enterprise."42 In November, 1935,
40. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, April 16, 1923.
41. The Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1928.
42. City of Boston, The Twentieth Annual Report of the
City-Planning Board for the Year Ending Decenber 31,
1933. Boston: January 31, 1934.
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a state legislator wrote the Mayor proposing a garage be-
neath both the Public Garden and the Common; he proposed
space for 30,000 cars at 25 cents each. And in 1936 a
city councilor picked up the Boston Common Garage idea
and annually presented it to the Council from 1936 to 1939.
The Common Garage was conceived as the savior of downtown
Boston. Here is the argument presented by Councilor Clem
Norton:
Mr. President, the downtown area of Boston
pays as much in taxes as all the rest of the
city put together. Property values must go
down unless the present traffic snarl in our
business area is straightened out. Adequate
parking areas should be considered. A study
should be made into the feasibility of having
a parking area, for instance, under part of
Boston Common. Objection may be anticipated
from historical societies but we already have
subways running under the Common. Leading cit-
ies are arranging for underground parking. 0-
ver 500,000 vehicles enter and leave the down-
town area daily and over one and one-half mil-
lion persons a day enter and leave this sec-
tion. Big stores and buildings stand to lose 43
out unless adequate parking areas are provided.
But the Mayor (Mansfield) was not interested.
When another state legislator, in April of 1937, proposed
parking on the Common, he was met by a storm of protest
from citizens, Mayor Mansfield, and the Park Commissioner.
So the state legislator, Francis X. Coyne of Dorchester,
43. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, December 7,
1936.
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modified his proposal and presented a bill to the State
Legislature for a garage under the Common. There was,
however, only weak support at both the city and state
level. Coyne's proposal to the 1937 and then to the 1938
Legislature met defeat; and Councilor Norton continued to
be ignored by the Mayor.
The pressure for additional parking facilities
in Boston continued, however. The American Automobile
Association prepared a study of Boston traffic conditions
in 1940 which pointed to increased traffic volumes, de-
creased mass transit use, and declining property values
in the Central Business District.44  The study report rec-
ommended that a coordinated plan for express streets and
parking facilities be prepared.4 5 That same year, Mayor
Tobin conducted a "Conference On Traffic," which included
a report prepared by the Conference's Committee On Off-
Street Parking. The study was done by the City Planning
Board staff; and it recommended the construction of 3,000
parking places within the next six years, according to
a comprehensive plan and financed by the city which would
44. American Automobile Association, Safety and Traffic
Engineering Department, Parking and Terminal Facili-
ties, Boston, Mass. Study, Washington D.C., Feb. 5,
1940.
45. Ibi., p. 7.
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sub-lease parking areas to private operators.46 The City
Law Department substantiated the legality of taking land
for parking, but stated that sub-leasing to private oper-
ators would be illegal.47 Thus legislative approval was
needed for such a leasing plan. So in 1941, Mayor Tobin
submitted a bill to the Legislature seeking authorization
to sell bonds, regulate rates, and lease to private opera-
tors.48 The bill was referred to a Recess Commission and
remained dormant until 1946.
The Common Garage was again proposed in 1941
when the Democratic floor leader of the State Senate pre-
sented a bill proposing the construction of a $15 million
bomb-proof parking garage under the Common. Like the
other parking proposal above, this legislation was also
scuttled until after the war. Interest in the parking
problem was displaced by the war effort.
B. PUBLICITY, CRISIS, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT
In 1945, the Chairman of the Democratic State
46. Mayor's Conference On Traffic Report of Off-Street
Parkinq Committee, The City Panning Boarld,Boston:
June 3, 1940.
47. Ibid., Appendix I.
48. House No. 1636.
Committee submitted a bill to the Legislature to provide
parking facilities under the Common. When the Boston City
Planning Board was asked by the City Legislative Agent to
consider the bill, the Board voted "to oppose House Bill
1337 as written, but that it is not opposed to a feasible
plan for underground parking in the Common."49 The bill
was defeated that year by opposition led by Henry L. Shat-
tuck, a Back Bay Republican. The defeat was only tempor-
ary, however, since six bills providing for an under-Common
Garage were presented to the 1946 Legislature. Also, Bos-
ton's large Hearst morning-newspaper, the Record, came
out in favor of the Garage, giving it a lot of favorable
publicity. The powerful Mayor of Boston, James Michael
Curley, filed one of the bills. Author of Curley's pro-
posal was William J. McDonald, a Boston real estate dealer
and a close friend of Mayor Curley. Curley filed the leg-
islation without consulting the City Planning Board.
On January 11, 1946, the day Curley filed leg-
islation for the Common Garage, the City Planning Board
also had-a meeting. Chairman of the City Planning Board,
William Stanley Parker, expressed concern regarding the
Mayor's stand. After a long discussion reviewing the
49. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1945,
March 9, 1945.
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Board's 1945 vote and the locational disadvantages of the
Garage, the Board meekly voted:
That the Chairman be requested to write
a letter to his Honor the Mayor asking for an
opportunity for the Board to meet with him to
discuss the Bgrd's proposals for various public
improvements.
At a second meeting on January 24, 1946, the
CityPlannin3Board Minutes read:
It was the sense of the meeting that the
Board should withhold any formal opposition
to bills, particularly the bills affecting the
Central Artery, removal of elevated structure,
parking underneath the Boston Common, off-street
parking and redevelopment until the Board has
an opportunity to talk these matters over with
the Mayor and present to him the Board's views.
It was also agreed that the Board should adhere
to the principle of first things first which
in this case is the Central Artery.
The Chairman asked for expressions of opin-
ion from the members on the bills for a garage
or parking underneath the Boston Common. The
sentiment was not wholly against parking under-
neath the Common, 5ut for a further and more
scientific study.
Then on February 8, 1946, the Board again dis-
cussed the legislative bills for parking facilities under
the Common. "The opinion of the members excepting the
Chairman, was that no further opposition should be ex-
pressed by the Board until a further study of the loca-
50. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1946,
January 11, 1946.
51. jbid&., January 24, 1946.
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tion is made."52
Between February and June, other matters took
up the Board's attention. During that time, they voted
to approve legislation for off-street parking facilities,
and tried to sell the Mayor on the idea of the Central
Artery. In June, they approved a letter to the Mayor
(from the Chairman) in which it was suggested that the
Planning Board and the Traffic Commission be permitted
to review and report upon the plans for the Common Garage
before final approval was given.53
Meanwhile the legislative wheels had been turn-
ing. Opposition to the Garage was expressed by members
of the Boston Common Society--an organization of prominent
54
Bostonians to protect the Boston Common from encroachment.
For the bills' hearing at the State House in February,
about 150 people showed up including a large representa-
tion-of downtown businessmen, That night, following the
afternoon hearing, leading merchants, businessmen, news-
paper and advertising representatives, and members of the
52. Ibi., February 8, 1946o
53. Ibid., June 14, 1946.
54. The Society's statement was signed by Samuel A. Eliot
(President), Charles D. Maginnis, Arthur A. Shurcliff,
Charles K. Bolton, Francis G. Curtis, and Myron E.
Pierce (Secretary). See The Christian Science Monitor,
February 18, 1946.
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State Legislature met at the Hotel Statler to hear Timothy
J. Pflueger, the architect who had designed San Francisco's
underground garage, extol the virtues of the garage and
explain why Boston needed one under the Common. The ad-
vertising manager of Hearst's Record-American presided
at the dinner meeting. The parking crisis was at its peak.
A solution was needed. The Boston Common Garage was it.
No doubt the parking problem was considered a crisis on
that day. "Both meetings came on a day when Boston was
experiencing one of its worst traffic tie ups in years
as hundreds of big trucks, following the three-day holi-
day, added to the rapidly mounting congestion in the down-
town and market district areas." 55 A garage under the
Common had become a symbolic solution to the parking prob-
lem--a problem which was thought to be one of the main
reasons for decline in the CBD. A Boston Common Parking
Garage was needed to save the downtown.
Needless to say, the legislation was passed in
July. On July 11, 1946, Mayor Curley signed an agreement
with Motor Park, Inc. whose head was William J. McDonald,
Curley's friend and big pusher for the legislation. The
law provided that the garage be built and operated by a
55. The Cristian Science Monitor, February 26, 1946.
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private firm under a 40 year lease whereby the City would
get an annual rent of 2 percent of gross receipts.5 6 The
financing was to be entirely private.
For Mayor Curley, the Garage was a good deal.
He pleased the downtown businessmen and paid a friend.
The Common Garage was one of those projects where planning
advice was not needed. The crisis dictated the solution. 5 7
In any case, the Planning Board hedged; and a parking study
would have only meant delay. There was no time for plan-
ning. Even if the Board had voted to oppose the Common
Garage legislation, the bill would most likely have passed
anyway.
William Stanley Parker, Chairman of the City
Planning Board and a professional planner, had obtained
Curley's permission to express his opinions publicly; and
he did. Parker argued that: (1) private enterprise could
not successfully operate the proposed garage, (2) respon-
sibility would fall on the city's taxpayers, (3) the ga-
rage would be in the wrong place for relieving traffic,
(4) it would attract traffic into the congested areas of
Boston, (5) the cost would be staggering, and (6) small,
56. Chapter 294, Acts of 1946, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts.
57. See Henry C. Hart, "Crisis, Community, and Consent
in Water Politics," LAW and Contemporary Problems,
Vol. 22, (3), (Summer, 1957), pp. 510-537.
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strategically located parking areas were needed.58 These
arguments were too late and unconvincing.
The Planning Board realized that its influence
was weak. In September, 1947, the Board discussed the
problem.
....There was a general feeling among the Board
members that a report of Off-Street Parking
would have been timely and stimulating some
months ago, but it would perhaps be inadvisable
at this time.
There was agreement as to the need of bring-
ing the work of the Planning Board before the pub-
lic through the pub Hcation of special reports,
perhaps two a year.
This was after legislation had passed authorizing
the construction of the Common Garage and other parking
facilities. The only action taken by the Board was a
vote supporting additional off-street parking facilities
and a recommendation that the minimum size of a parking
lot should be from 10,000 to 15,000 square feet, with maxi-
mum space for 600 cars.60
The fact that Mayor Curley by-passed the Board
should not be construed to mean that he disliked planning.
There was free communication between Curley and planning
58. The Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1946.
59. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1946,
September 27, 1946.
60. Xaid., July 12, 1946.
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director, Thomas E. McCormick.61 And Curley used the plan-
ning staff's advice on other occasions. But the pressure
was so strong for the Garage that the Planning Board's
advice did not matter; and the need for the Garage prob-
ably appeared to be so obvious that expert opinion from
the planning staff would have been superfluous.
Since the Board was uncommitted and passive and
since expert planning advice was not given to or solicited
by the Mayor or Council, many of the hypotheses formulated
for this study are not applicable to the 1946 events. The
planning staff did not actually perform any of the roles
outlined by Rabinowitz--i.e. Technical, Broker, Mobilizer.
The planners showed no particular bias concerning private
or public action. Nor were the planners used by the Mayor
or anyone else to support factional interests. Expert
opinion was not compromised, because none was explicitly
given.
In relation to Hypothesis 5, the planning direc-
tor was biased in favor of tangible, quantifiable, predic-
table criteria of choice. In the 1946 Annual Report of
the City Planning Board, the Executive Director (McCormick)
listed these reasons why the Common Garage would be unfav-
61. Based on interview with McCormick.
L
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orable: (1) "That a garage under the Common with entrances
on Charles street would place it in the midst of an unoc-
cupied area;" (2) "that it would be over a thousand feet
distant from the business district;" (3) "that it would be
in an area which is now the best served from the point
of parking facilities;" and (4) "that it would cause ter-
rific congestion at peak hours on Charles street."6 2 These
arguments, however, were not based upon a thorough study
of parking needs; and they were not introduced until after
the Garage legislation had passed. They were included
in an obscure annual report that very few people read.
Predictability was involved in that appraisal of the Ga-
rage's feasibility had been based upon crude predictions
of parking demand and traffic congestion.
The planners did not conflict with political
leaders because no contact between the two was made. The
fact that Curley did not consult the Planning Board or
staff showed that his orientation was toward the political
reality of satisfying strong pressure and rewarding suppor-
ters (McDonald). His conceptions of rationality and public
62. City of Boston, Thirty-Third Annual Report of the
City Planning Board For The Year Ending December 31,
1946, Boston: January 31, 1947. A crude parking
study is included in Appendix I; but it was not for-
mally released. It pertained mainly to other parking
facilities to be built under Chapter 474, Acts of
1946.
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welfare were politically determined. His short-run inter-
ests could not wait for a "study" or "advice". The planner
was ignored because immediate action seemed necessary. Cur-
ley had the support of the City Council. There was no real
conflict of views between politicians and planners. The
planners' opinion was too late, unconvincing, and noncom-
mital; so it never really entered the arena (except unof-
ficially through Chairman Parker.)
Hypotheses 7 and 8 do not apply to the 1946 ac-
tivities. All the hypotheses are tested later in the Garage's
history. The City Planning Board and staff did not face
the Common Garage issue again until 1954. During the in-
tervening years, however, the Board and planning staff
exercised important powers in approving locations for muni-
cipal parking garages, as required under the 1946 Off-Street
Parking Facilities Law (Chapter 474). The battle for and
against the Common Garage remained in the political arena;
and the residents of Back Bay and Beacon Hill continued
to oppose it.
C. POLITICAL STRUGGLE
Since the turn of the century, Boston's politi-
cal structure has been dominated by the Irish and Italians--
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mainly the Irish.63 Around 1890 the Irish numbers over-
took the native Yankee political strength in the City of
Boston, so the Yankees turned to the state level for con-
trol of city government. From there they imposed a state-
appointed Finance Commission to investigate and review
Boston activities, and a police commissioner and licensing
board also appointed by the governor. Since that time,
the Massachusetts Legislature has enjoyed a long history
of meddling in Boston affairs. It was 1948 before the
Democrats finally gained control of the House, and 1958
before control was obtained in the Senate. Boston's city
government frequently had difficulty getting what it wanted
from the State Legislature.
In 1909, the Republicans put through a charter
making Boston's elected offices nonpartisan and establish-
ing a nine-member elected-at-large Council. This was con-
ceived as a means of increasing Republican strength since
the Democrats outnumbered them two to one.64 In 1924,
63. The next four paragraphs are drawn mainly from Edward
C. Banfield and Martha Derthrick, eds., A Rport on
the Politics of Boston. 2 Vols., mimeographed, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Ur-
ban Studies, 1960.
64. Nonpartisanship has helped the Republicans; whereas
the at-large system made it more difficult for them
to get people elected.
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the Charter was revised to provide for a district voting
system with a twenty-two member Council.. And in 1949,
when reform pressure was high, the Charter was changed
back to a nine-member Council, elected at large. The of-
fices have remained nonpartisan since 1909.
The Council is notoriously weak, particularly
since the reform charter went into effect in 1951. The
old ward system had given each Councilor a constituency
to which he was responsible; and he could use his ward
as a base for political power. During the 1950's, with
an at-large system, some Irish and Italian councilors,
who tended to regard local areas as home base, floundered.
They faced a Mayor with a city-wide constituency; and they
had difficulty assuming the role of statesmen for the city
as a whole. The Council was virtually powerless and had
no important functions to perform. When a local citizen
wanted assistance or advice from his representative, he
visited the state legislator from his district.
The Mayor in Boston's nonpartisan system must
make a wide appeal. Candidates for Mayor tend to minimize
their party connections. They rely heavily on communica-
tions media and city-wide interests to gain votes. Curley
was a "personality" who had charismatic appeal. Hynes,
L
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who succeeded him, was a reform candidate with broad civ-
ic support. Both were Irish. Occasionally, the Mayor
may have difficulties with the Council which, if it does
anything at all, may take on the function of being the
watchdog of the public interest.
Mayor Curley had built a strong organization
based upon the ward-style of politics. He had been active
in politics for about 50 years and could muster strong
political support at both the city and state level when
necessary. Hynes had been assistant city clerk and then
city clerk during the Curley era. He was, in effect, a
product of the Curley machine. Both Curley and Hynes fa-
vored the Boston Common Parking Garage. Both responded
to pressure from downtown businessmen.
On the other side of the issue were the old Yan-
kee families who saw the Garage as a threat to the hallowed
Boston Common--a piece of public land which they wanted
to protect for the enjoyment of all Boston citizens.6 5
65. Their interests were also partially selfish; many of
their homes were near the Common.
L
They were supported by the arguments of city planners,
who in the spirit of the public-regarding tradition,66
gave reasons why the Garage was "irrational." Their poli-
tical resources were meager, however, because their allies
in the tradition, the downtown merchants, had "irration-
ally" seized upon the Garage as the symbolic panacea of
their own problems. To overcome this deluge of political
power, :the Yankees turned to the courts. In the fifteen
years after 1946, blocked in their efforts to overcome
the legislative power of the Irish Democrats (who probably
would have opposed anything the Yankees were for, as a
matter of traditional hostility) and the downtown business-
men, the Yankees turned again and again to the delays of
courtroom justice.
In August, 1946, representatives of the Beacon
Hill Civic Association, the Boston Common Society, and
the Bostonian Society filed petitions in Superior Court.
An injunction was obtained. There were three petitions.
One petition, filed by Alfred P. Lowell and others, sought
66. Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., distinguish between
a private-regarding view of the public interest and
a public-regarding view. The former derives from
immigrant-group politics which sought special favors
for local wards. The latter derives from the middle
class ethos emphasizing efficiency and impartiality
ingovernment.
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to restrain municipal officials from imposing unauthorized
financial obligations on the City, and alleged that the
proposed use of the Common would be contrary to the terms
of certain testamentary gifts that the City had accepted.
Another petition, filed by Myron E. Pierce and others,
maintained that the City held the land by a gift made in
1634 to the City for use by its inhabitants as a Common
and that the City held the land in a trust relation to
those for whose use the Common land was provided. And a
third petition, filed by Anna C. McCarthy and others, sought
to enforce the terms of a 1908 gift by George Francis Park-
man who devised the residue of his estate to the City for
care of the Common and Public Garden subject to the condi-
tion that no part of the land therein would ever be used
67
for any other public purpose.
In testimony before the Superior Court, it was
revealed that Motor Park, Inc. had only $529.76 in assets.
To counter testimony about the assets of Motor Park, Inc.,
the defendants produced the vice president of the First
Boston Corporation who testified that his company was ready
to advance five to six million dollars for construction
67. See Lowell, Pierce, McCarthy, et al. v. City of Bos-
ton et al., 332 Mass. 709, 79 NE 2d 713 (1948) for the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling which
summarizes the arguments.
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of the Garage. Following weeks of hearings, the case was
reported to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
January, 1948, with certain findings of fact-almost a
year and a half after the Garage legislation had passed.
In May, the high court dismissed the petitions and ruled
that the City had the right to contract for a garage under
the Common, so long as the Common retained its primary
use as a public park.
Mayor Curley and McDonald jubilantly said that
68
work on the Garage would begin "right away." The dis-
appointed Yankees said they would go to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Meanwhile Curley pressed for legislation which
would make the Garage tax-exempt; the bill was approved
by the Legislature in June. Construction of the Garage
was delayed until plans could be drafted and until the
U. S. Supreme Court ruled on the case. In October, the
Supreme Court refused to consider the case.
Curley announced in December that ground would
be broken for the Garage by the latter part of March.
In a last-ditch try to stop it, William Stanley Parker
sent a letter to the Mayor (and to the newspapers) criti-
cizing the Garage. Parker contended that the Garage was
68. The Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1948.
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too expensive, that it would damage the Common, that finan-
cial backing for it was doubtful, and that its location
was inconvenient. He reasserted his proposal for strate-
gic sites and mentioned the City Planning Board vote rec-
ommending a maximum of 600 car spaces. To this, Mayor
Curley indignantly retorted: "Mr. Parker is the only bot-
tleneck that has held up Boston traffic in the past 25
years. Aggressive men have replaced him and they are try-
ing to solve the city's traffic problems with a workable
69
program."
But Parker was right. Difficulty in getting
investors plagued the Garage proponents. Back Bay legis-
lators tried to get the tax exemption legislation repealed
in the 1949 Legislature; but they were unsuccessful. The
Garage's construction appeared imminent if only Motor Park,
Inc. could get a commitment for financial backing. Mayor
Hynes took office in January, 1950; he was committed to
the Common Garage. In his inaugural address, Hynes said:
"The construction of an underground garage beneath Boston
Common would be an important step toward solution of our
parking problem. I intend to use every resource to hasten
69. The Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 1948.
Note: William Stanley Parker's appointed term as
chairman and member of the Planning Board expired
in 1948.
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the building of this project with private capital, as pro-
70
vided under the law authorizing its erection." On Jan-
uary 27, Motor Park, Inc. told Mayor Hynes they were con-
fident of obtaining required financial backing within three
weeks. Mayor Hynes told the company's representatives that
if they could not secure backing soon, they should step
aside and let other investors come into the picture. Un-
der a contract with the City, Motor Park, Inc. had until
July 1 to begin work. It was revealed at that time that
Bernard Goldfine, a wealthy textile manufacturer later
known for his gifts to presidential aide Sherman Adams,
was a stockholder in the firm. Goldfine was involved in
getting a Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) loan
for construction of the Garage. The head of the National
Securities Resources Board (NSRB) was a receiver of Christ-
mas gifts from Goldfine who later testified that the NSRB
head was very helpful in getting the RFC loan approval.71
It was June, 1950, when Mayor Hynes and Governor Dever made
a trip to Washington and conferred with President Truman.
They sought to impress upon Truman the need for the RFC
loan to Motor Park, Inc. so that the private firm could
build a bomb-proof Common Garage. They had applied for
70. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, January 2, 1950.
71. The Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1958.
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a $12 million RFC loan. Governor Dever claimed that the
Garage would accommodate 4,200 autos and could protect
90,000 persons in an emergency. President Truman promised
to inquire about the application. On June 30, the RFC
announced that it had approved a $12 million loan to Motor
Park, Inc. But technicalities over loan requirements re-
mained to be negotiated. By November it was clear that
the RFC would require $3 million in collateral before the
loan could be granted. Mayor Hynes stated that if Motor
Park, Inc. could not deliver, he would seek financial
support elsewhere. It was rumored that a large gasoline
company was showing interest in the Garage. Mayor Hynes
had promised to get the Garage built. If he was unsuccess-
ful, Curley could make political capital of it in the 1951
72
mayoralty campaign.
In December, 1950, Governor Dever, John Fox (De-
ver's Secretary), Goldfine, and the counsel for Motor Park,
Inc. went to Washington to discuss the project again with
President Truman. Goldfine had succeeded the deceased
McDonald as president of Motor Park, Inc. Their purpose
in Washington was to have the $3 million collateral re-
quirement eased. After the trip, Motor Park, Inc. claimed
72. The Christian Science Monitor, November 24, 1950.
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they could put up the necessary $3 million, but that differ-
ence existed as to the type of collateral. Hynes felt the
firm should be given a chance because they had already in-
vested about $500,000 in plans for the Garage.73 In Decem-
ber, 1950, Hynes said:
I want the garage completed and by private en-
terprise so that the city can get a fair return
(figured at $100,000 a year)....We need the ga-
rage. It is the keystone to the arch of our
traffic problem. We need it doubly as a bomb-
shelter in the center of the city. If this con-
cern gin do it, it will save at least a year of
time.
Motor Park, Inc. was given another extension (its
fourth) until March 30, 1951 to obtain financial backing.
When March came, Mayor Hynes stated he was encouraged;
private investment concerns were showing interest in the
Garage. The March 30 deadline was reached. Goldfine said
Motor Park, Inc. could not meet RFC terms for a loan.
Governor Dever introduced legislation to allow insurance
companies to invest in it. And Hynes gave Motor Park, Inc.
an extension until July 1 to begin construction; the firm
was required to post a $25,000 certified check to be for-
feited if the deadline could not be met. Meanwhile, State
Representative Gabriel F. Piemonte had filed a bill to
73. At least that is what Motor Park, Inc. claimed.
74. The Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1950.
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establish a public authority which would build the Garage.
In April, the RFC announced that it had in ef-
fect rejected the loan application of Motor Park, Inc.
The agency refused to extend the time limit for posting
security for the loan. Backers of the Garage turned to
the insurance legislation as the basis for financing.
The House rejected the bill by a vote of 127-96 on May
15, 1951. Governor Dever put pressure on the legislative
body to change its vote. The next day, the House reversed
itself (133-93) and approved the legislation which had
already passed the Senate. On June 8, the bill was signed
by the Governor. But it was rumored that the insurance
companies were no longer interested.
Motor Park, Inc. forfeited the $25,000 on July 1,
at which time they were given another extension until Sep-
tember 12 with $10,000 posted. Hynes said they were nego-
tiating with a major oil company and two insurance compan-
ies to finance the Garage. But the money was forfeited
on September 12; and Hynes gave the firm another extension.
There was anxiety at the time over a national steel shor-
tage which would delay construction. No money was posted
for this 2-1/2 month extension. It was not met either.
Hynes continued to give extensions.
L
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In November, 1952, John Fox, millionaire publish-
er of the Boston,_ Post (which he had just purchased in Sep-
tember), announced that he planned to participate actively
and financially in getting the Garage constructed. So
Hynes gave Motor Park, Inc. a one year extension. Fox
testified later that Governor Dever had brought Fox and
Goldfine together on the Garage deal; Fox was formerly
Governor Dever's secretary. Mayor Hynes announced in Jan-
uary that he was confident the Garage would be started in
1953. The City of Boston was opposing two bills in the
Legislature which would have a public authority build it.
Hynes preferred private financing, since it would not cost
the City anything.
The Yankee opponents to the Garage had maintained
constant opposition. Every year they threatened to or ac-
tually filed legislation to hinder or prevent the Garage's
construction. In 1953, they sought to repeal the 1946
legislation authorizing the Garage. At every possible
public hearing since 1945, they were there to protest.
They were never successful, however; they were vastly out-
numbered in the Legislature.
In December, 1953, Mayor Hynes refused to extend
the exclusive privileges of Motor Park, Inc. to construct
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the Garage. He opened the bidding to others, with the
reservation that Motor Park, Inc. would have ninety days
in which to meet any offer. The Mayor was getting impa-
tient. In January, 1954, he sought legislation which would
authorize the City to prepare plans for the Garage and
then advertise for construction bids. The Boston Common
Society countered with vocal opposition at the hearing and
with legislation of their own to repeal the 1946 Act.
Both bills, the Mayor's and the Society's, faltered.
All during the year, Motor Park, Inc. continued
to drop hints that private financing was imminent. Hynes
was skeptical. In early December, 1954, he filed two bills
in the Legislature. One was to allow Boston to prepare plans
for construction in lieu of possible private financing.
The other bill was to establish a public authority to con-
struct the Garage and then lease it. The second bill was
similar to a bill which had been introduced perenially
since 1951 by Representative Piemonte. Hynes still left
the door open for private financing, while pushing for the
public authority legislation.
It was late in 1954 that the City Planning Board
and its staff became involved in the debate over the Com-
mon Garage. It should be pointed out that Mayor Hynes
7
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had already exerted considerable effort on behalf of the
Garage; he was firmly committed. It was late in the Ga-
rage's development history when expert planning advice
was finally sought.
D. THE PLANNER'S ADVICE
Since 1946 the Planning Board had been approving
locations for smaller municipal parking garages. And dur-
ing the early 1950's, its staff had done work on a compre-
hensive general plan and a six-year capital improvement
program. Mayor Hynes, in the first year of his administra-
tion, had pressed for these two items in order to qualify
for federal funds under provisions of the 1949 Housing
Act. In addition, the Planning Board and staff had been
involved in discussions of plans for the Central Artery--
an expressway to be built along the eastern edge of the
central business area. During 1954, the planning staff
had been collecting parking data and had begun an effort
to formulate a major street plan consistent with the Cen-
tral Artery. They had collected parking data in connec-
tion with the approval of municipal parking sites. In
October, 1954, Robert G. Davidson, Principal Planner, ob-
tained permission of the Planning Board to prepare a down-
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town parking program showing where additional spaces were
needed. By mid-December, the initial draft of the report
was completed and sent to members of the Planning Board.
It included a recommendation against the Common Garage.
The Board deferred approval of the report until January.
During the months September to December, 1954,
Councilor Piemonte (the former state representative) re-
quested information from the Mayor about the status of the
Common Garage and asked that a master parking facilities
plan be developed including a brochure to attract inves-
tors for the Garage. The Council, like the Mayor, was
interested in parking.
At the Planning Board's next meeting on January
18, 1955, the Board members approved the report for repro-
duction and distribution. But the first draft had already
leaked to the newspapers. Robert C. Bergenheim, city re-
porter for The Christian Science Monitor, had maintained
friendly relations with the planning staff. He scooped
the other papers and published the initial report find-
ings.
The staff parking study included data by sub-
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district on: (1) the amount of and expected changes
in square feet of business accommodations in the CBD; (2)
the existing and expected number of person-trips to the
CBD; (3) expected increase in traffic due to the Central
Artery; (4) expected number of passenger car trips to the
CBD; (5) the existing and expected number of passenger cars
to be parked, by type of parking facility; (6) existing
on-street and off-street parking spaces; and (7) new park-
ing spaces needed. The projected data was for 1965. The
report included a map showing a recommended system of 500-
car space off-street parking facilities, distributed accor-
ding to the demand of each district, with the availability
of sites partially accounted for. The sites were within
400 feet walking distance of all major parts of the busi-
ness area; the report stated that this distance was con-
sistent with acceptable walking distances. The report al-
so claimed that the suggested locations were in areas where
highest economic return could be expected. The 500-space
size of facility was regarded as in scale with the capa-
75. Boston City Planning Board, A Parking Program For
The Boston Central Business Area. Boston: December,
1954. This paragraph is taken from the final copy
of the report which was not much different from the
first draft, except for the Common Garage recommen-
dation.
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city of Boston's local streets. According to the report,
about 10,000 to 12,000 new spaces would be needed over
the next ten years (1955 to 1965). The report also in-
cluded a time schedule for construction, recommended poli-
cy for parking rates (favorable to the short-term parker),
and a recommendation for a few elevator-type garages. The
report concluded with a discussion of site priorities.
Ten sites were assigned high priority (deserving immedi-
ate action). Five other locations were given low priority;
for these the report recommended a "wait-and-see" policy
pending new development or demonstrated demand after other
facilities were in operation. The cost of the high prior-
ity sites was placed at about $3,100 per space or a total
cost of about $13 million. The final copy of the report
which had been slightly changed by the Board, concluded
with this sentence:
The Planning Board voted to go on record as
favoring the construction of a garage under
Boston Common in accordance with thq6provi-
sions set forth in House Bill 1275.
The concluding sentence represented a strange
twist of the logic of the study. The area proposed for
the Common Garage did not even fall within the defined
76. Ibid., p. 19.
7,5 2-
central business district. This sentence was a contra-
diction of the study's analysis of parking demand. It
was in fact a rejection of the planning staff's advice.
Davidson, who had conducted the study and who wrote the
report, made no attempt to fit the Common Garage recommen-
dation into the study. Davidson was not happy with the
change; so he merely stuck that one defenseless sentence,
which was taken verbatim from Board Minutes, at the end
77
of the report. Bergenheim had caught the planning staff's
real attitude toward the Common Garage in his December,
1954, article covering the report's first draft. In the
first draft, Davidson had written:
Noticeable for its abscence in this pro-
gram is the under-the-Common garage.
This facility is not recommended because:
1. It is located closest to the Park Square
area that is sufficiently served by existing ga-
rages.
2. It is too far distant from the major
retail area to properly serve it.
3. The construction of other parking fa-
cilities in (and nearer) the retail area will
provide better service (and decrease the poten-
tial use of the Common garage if constructed).
4. It apparently will be more expensive
per space than the igh priority sites recom-
mended herein...."
77. Based on an interview with Davidson.
78 "Common Fails to Fit Into Parking Plan," The Christian
Science Monitor, December 23, 1954.
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But Mayor Hynes was pushing legislation for the
Common Garage. In late January, 1955, Hynes, Thomas F.
McDonough, Chairman of the Planning Board and a friend of
Mayor Hynes, and other officials made a trip to Chicago
where they looked at a number of parking garages there.
One of the garages they looked at was a garage under Chi-
cago's Grant Park. Upon return, McDonough was armed with
information to support the Mayor. At the City Planning
Board meeting on February 1, 1955, McDonough reported that
he had been under pressure from the City Council for the
parking report (not yet released) but that the Mayor felt
some decision on the Boston Common Garage should be in-
cluded in the report.79 McDonough reported that Chicago's
underground garage was very successful. After a lengthy
discussion of the Common Garage and the proposed legisla-
tion, the Board voted four to two in favor of the Garage
(three members were absent).80 Hence the odd sentence at
the end of the parking study report.
79. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1955,
February 1, 1955.
80. The actual vote was not recorded in the minutes.
Bergenheim of The Christian Science Monitor reported
that in checking with the individual members the
vote was four to two. A check of the absentee mem-
bers revealed one opposed, one undecided, and one
out-of-town. See The Christian Science Monitor,
February 4, 1955.
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The fact that the Board changed the study report
against the planning staff's recommendation probably did
not surprise anyone at the time. Relations between the
Board and the planning staff were bad.81 Chairman McDonough,
an aggressive Irishman, dominated the Board. He did not
respect the technical abilities of the planning staff; and
he seemed to feel his judgment was just as good or better
than the staff's advice. He was impatient with the planning
director, Thomas E. McCormick, who was somewhat timid and
stumbling in his appearance before the Board. McCormick
was dedicated but was not regarded by the Mayor as the per-
son to handle anything big. He had been on the planning
staff since 1930 and had been Executive Director since 1944.
There had been virtually no communication between McCor-
mick and Mayor Hynes. Planning information was channeled
through Chairman McDonough. The Mayor's failure to use
planning (even as well as Curley had) can be partly ex-
plained by the fact that McCormick was not sufficiently
aggressive.
Two other members of the planning staff were
stronger personalities. One was Davidson, Principal Plan-
81. This paragraph and the next two are based upon inter-
views with members of the staff, the Mayor, members
of the Planning Board, and newspaper reporters cover-
ing city news.
ner, who had been with the Planning Board since 1950. He
was regarded by McCormick as one of the most competent
people on the staff. Davidson was most familiar with the
parking problem and had been active in preparing the capi-
tal improvement program. When McCormick took a six-week
sick leave authorized on February 1, 1955, Davidson filled
in as Director. While McCormick was resting in Florida,
Davidson maintained his position against the Common Ga-
rage. Having conducted the parking study, he was highly
opinionated. In a meeting in the Mayor's office attended
by leading downtown businessmen, the Mayor asked if anyone
opposed the Garage; Davidson was the only one who raised
his hand. The other planner involved in the parking study
was John T. Howard, a consultant to the planning staff.
Howard was a leading name in the planning profession and
was a planning professor at M.I.T. He advised Davidson
throughout the parking study. Howard had been a consul-
tant to the Planning Board staff since 1950. Neither Da-
vidson nor Howard were intimidated by Chairman McDonough.
The morale of the resident planners was low.
The staff was largely isolated from the political arena.
McCormick represented the staff at Board meetings; and
Howard attended when necessary. The problems of the plan-
ning staff were presented to the Board a year later in
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a report prepared by Howard.82 The consultant report
stated that: (1) there were not enough fully-profession-
al city planners on the staff; (2) the salary rates were
too low; (3) the planners had low morale and lacked a sense
of accomplishment; (4) there was not enough emphasis on
the liaison function of the planning staff to other city
departments; (5) better communication with the public was
needed; (6) there was a lack of understanding between the
Board and the staff; (7) the Board should have relied upon
other staff members besides the Director to make presen-
tations before the Board; (8) the Board tended to act
promptly on matters from the outside and to therefore de-
fer consideration of studies by the staff; (9) the Board
was reluctant to try new ideas on the public or the Mayor,
until the Board was convinced they would be accepted. In
addition, Davidson was suspected by the Board of having
released the parking study to Bergenheim of the Monitor.
Thus the role of the planning staff was Techni-
cal. They performed none of the other roles suggested
by Rabinowitz. Information leaks to the newspaper, how-
ever, were probably used to gain broader attention to their
views. But on the whole, their influence was limited to
82. Adams, Howard & Greeley, Consultants, "Report On Staff
Problems," report prepared for the Boston City Plan-
ning Board, mimeo, May 7, 1956.
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technical advice given when asked. They were frustrated
in their efforts by a politically-minded, unsympathetic
Planning Board and a Mayor who committed himself without
their advice. The fact that the planners maintained their
position against the Garage affected the subsequent his-
tory of the Garage. After a review of the Garage's later
development is presented, conclusions about the hypotheses
will be presented.
E. A PACKAGE DEAL
The political battle for and against the Garage
continued. When asked to comment on the Planning Board's
divided vote, Mayor Hynes said: "I don't want to get into
a fight with the Planning Board, but I want that garage
built. Without it the shopping area along Tremont and
Boylston Streets won't exist in five years as we know it
today. It will be filled with cheap stores...." 8 3 The
battle seemed to be picking up. The Greater Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce announced its backing of Mayor Hyne's pub-
lic authority bill. Prominent Yankees sent letters to
the editor opposing the Garage. The executive director
of the State Club blasted the Garage; he said: "It's the
83. The Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1955.
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biggest lemon since the invention of gold bricks....It's
an attempt to flim-flam the public."84 Supporters of the
Garage included the Retail Trade Board and the head of
Filene's Department Store. They along with Hynes announ-
ced that various private interests were willing to invest
in it. In May, 1955, Motor Park, Inc. claimed readiness
to sign a contract for an immediate start of construction.
Supported by leading downtown businessmen, Mayor Hynes
announced he would continue to press for the public author-
ity legislation, even though Motor Park, Inc. claimed to
be ready. The public authority was conceived as a permis-
sive safety-valve in case private financing did not come
through. John Fox, publisher of the Boston Post, dis-
closed that he had purchased a majority of the stock in
Motor Park, Inc. Fox opposed the authority legislation
because it would endanger the position of Motor Park, Inc.
A battle of newspapers developed. Backing the authority
method of financing were the Boston Herald-Traveler and
the Boston DailyRecord-American. The Boston Post, of
course, opposed it. Also, opposing the authority was
Senator John E. Powers (D), Senate Minority Leader and
announced candidate to oppose Mayor Hynes in the 1955 elec-
84. The Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1955.
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tion. Powers and his supporters argued that the author-
ity would only complicate things and weaken the position
of Motor Park, Inc. Powers and Fox were joined by the
Boston Common Society. By a vote of 20 to 19, Powers
sidetracked the bill in the Senate. There were broad
hints that former Governor Paul Dever, counsel for Motor
Park, Inc., had influenced the voting. After the vote,
Mayor Hynes asserted that he was confident Motor Park,
Inc. would soon begin construction. Meanwhile, the en-
gineering firm which prepared plans for the Garage revealed
that a vehicular access tunnel to the Garage from Common-
wealth Avenue would require costly relocation of water
mains under the Public Garden. Cost of the tunnel would
also be increased, they revealed, due to the fact that
two little known laws required that both an equestrian
statue of George Washington and the pedestrian bridge in
the Public Garden could not be disturbed. The pipelines
and vehicular tunnel would have to go around them.
Governor Herter introduced legislation to permit
the City of Boston to take.land for the Boston Common Ga-
rage by eminent domain. The City had asked for the legis-
lation in order to complete a contract with Motor Park,
Inc. The land to be taken was a small portion of Common-
2
hi-man & Howard, Engineers
This map shows the plans for the Garage as
vehicular tunnel from Commonwealth Avenue,
car tunnel leading to the retail district.
Howard, Engineers. The above map appeared
1955.)
proposed in July, 1955. In addition to the
the plans called for a pedestrian shuttle-
(Reproduced by permission of Whitman &
in The Christian Science Monitor, July 14,
0
t- ew e-. i '
j
M
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wealth Avenue for approaches (including the vehicular tun-
nel under the Public Garden) to the Garage. On July 8,
1955, the legislation was passed. The City and Motor Park,
Inc. reportedly were ready to sign a contract to begin con-
struction within ninety days. Fox publicly released the
company's plans; they were very similar to those proposed
in 1949. Fox estimated that the Garage would cost $11
million and would hold 3,700 cars.
William Stanley Parker and Henry L. Shattuck
asked for a public hearing before the contract was signed.
At the hearing, Parker and Shattuck said that court action
would be taken to stop the Garage if the contract was
signed. They raised two main points against the plans
to be followed under the contract: (1) Fifty percent of
the Garage would be some four to six feet above the pre-
sent level of the Common in violation of the 1946 statute;
and (2) The 1946 law did not allow concessions within the
Garage (Fox's plans included a snack bar, auto lubrication
and wash stands, and battery rooms). They raised other
arguments against the Garage, including: (1) serious drain-
age and pipe relocation problems; (2) disturbance of the
water table to the detriment of nearby buildings; (3) an
ugly open hole and closing of the Public Garden for two
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years; and (4) destruction of valuable trees. Parker and
Shattuck won a delay in the signing of the contract.
On November 4, 1955, the contract was signed--
less than a week before the municipal election. It was
revealed that John Fox owned one hundred percent of the
stock of Motor Park, Inc. Shattuck and Parker said imme-
diate court action would be started on two points: (1)
conformance with the 1946 statute (ground level); and (2)
tax exemption of the Garage. They filed a petition in
Suffolk Superior Court later that month to test the first
point. And on December 9, 1955, three commercial parking
garages and a Beacon Hill property owner, Samuel Cabot,
filed a petition to force the City to assess real estate
85
taxes on the Common Garage. On December 23, 1955, the
Superior Court ruled on the earlier petition, stating that
the construction had to be "under Boston Common. ,86
Motor Park, Inc. had changed its name to Boston
Common Garage, Inc. in November. After the court ruling,
the firm announced that new plans were in existence to
meet the court-ruling requirement. On December 29, Coun-
cilor Piemonte, an avowed foe of John Fox, had the Council
85. Samuel Cabot et al. v. Assessors of Boston et al.,
335 Mass. 53 (1955).
86. Henry L. Shattuck et al. v. Boston Common Garage, Inc.
et al., No. 70553 (1955).
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adopt an order requesting Mayor Hynes to restrict the pro-
posed Garage to parking and storing cars (no concessions).
In January, it was revealed that Socony Mobile Company,
Inc. was interested in operating the Garage. Boston Com-
com Garage, Inc. introduced new plans in February, 1956,
calling for about 1000 fewer cars than the other plans
for 3,700 cars. The new plans would have raised the Com-
mon level about two feet above existing grade, although
the Garage itself would have been six inches below the
existing level. The second set of plans failed to get ap-
proval by the Boston Park Commission. But Hynes said that
construction should start by April 15 or May 1. In April,
the Prudential Insurance Company of America was reported
set to invest $9,500,000 in the project. On April 30,
the Superior Court ruled that tax-exemption under the 1948
legislation was legal. A group of Beacon Hill residents
made preparations to take the tax exemption issue to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court and to the U.S. Supreme Court
if necessary. Hynes began to despair that the Garage would
never be built during his term of office (until January,
1960). In June, the Adams, Howard, & Greeley confidential
87 88
"Report On Staff Problems" was leaked to the Monitor.
87. Adams, Howard, & Greeley, op. cit.
88. "Hub Consulting Firm Sees Politics on Planning Board,"
The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1956.
Bergenheim slightly twisted the report's statements and
stressed "politics" on the Planning Board. He pointed
to the 1955 vote favoring the Common Garage as an example.
And Chairman McDonough, head of an architectural firm,
was alleged to have political motivations, as evidenced
by the contracts McDonough had received from the City.
Also, vice chairman Joseph A. Mitchell was mentioned as
a special representative of a major advertising firm in
the city; Bergenheim's article pointed out that the Plan-
ning Board passed on regulations for billboards and that
advertising firms rented billboard space from the City.
The next year, when McDonough's term expired, he was not
reappointed. McDonough found the 1956 publicity "very
distasteful" and "very unpleasant to go through." 89 In
July, 1956, the Planning Board voted to release the con-
sultant report, saying: "The Planning Board agrees in the
main with the report and intends putting into effect many
of the recommendations in the near future and giving fur-
ther study to the remaining suggestions."90 Significantly,
it was during 1956 that eight members of the planning staff
resigned, including Davidson.
In November, 1956, the Massachusetts Supreme
89. City of Boston, City.Planning Board Minutes: 1956,
June 26, 1956.
90. Ibid,, July 6, 1956.
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Court ruled tax exemption for the Garage to be legal.
The Beacon Hill group said they would appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Efforts in the Legislature to repeal the
1946 act had failed during 1956. Private promoters of
the Garage said they would go ahead seeking approval of
plans. Mayor Hynes, in January, 1957, said he would move
immediately to have it built by a public authority, if
private enterprise could not do it. He also said he would
favor a smaller garage, without a vehicular tunnel if
necessary. At a public hearing before the Legislative
Committee on Cities in February, representatives of the
Chamber of Commerce, the Boston Real Estate Board, and
the Retail Trade Board testified in favor of a smaller
Garage of from 1500 to 2000 cars to be built by a public
authority. Appearing in opposition were William Stanley
Parker, the President of the Beacon Hill Association (Gail
Mahoney), and Representative James C. Bayley (R) from the
Back Bay district. Parker offered three amendments and
told newsmen that if his amendments were accepted, he
might withdraw his opposition to the bill even though he
was opposed to the Garage. The three amendments provided:
(1) construction below grade; (2) elimination of the vehic-
ular tunnel; and (3) entrance and exit ramps running paral-
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lel to Charles Street (as opposed to an entrance and exit
requiring turns as provided in plans to date).
In June, 1957, Mayor Hynes gave John Fox, whose
Boston Post folded in 1956, ninety days to produce satis-
factory plans for the Garage. Also in June, the U.S. Su-
preme Court dismissed the tax exemption case.91 And two
downtown stores announced they were closing; their closing
re-emphasized the relative decline of the shopping district.
Then in August, Frank R. Kelly, Park and Recreation Commis-
sioner, announced he might demand an entirely new set of
plans if changes in existing plans were made piecemeal.
The City gave Boston Common Garage, Inc. until October 15
to post bond. Meanwhile supporters won in their battle
for a public authority to build it. In September, Governor
Furcolo signed legislation whereby the City of Boston could
establish a separate public authority to finance the Ga-
rage. October 15 came; and no bond was presented. Within
a few days, Mayor Hynes moved to establish the public auth-
ority. The City advertised for construction bids. But the
Mayor had to get the City Council's approval to create a
Boston Common Authority.92 The Council decided to have a
91. Cabot v. Alphen.
92. Chapter 701, Acts of 1957. The Authority was to issue
revenue bonds.
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public hearing, setting two dates in late November, 1957.
The first day, the Council heard arguments for the Garage;
the second day--arguments against.93 Those appearing in
favor were: (1) the Executive Secretary of Allied Theatres
of New England; (2) the President of the Retail Trade Board;
(3) the President of the Boston Real Estate Board; (4) a
representative of the Back Bay Association (an association
of business firms in the Back Bay area); (5) the Secretary-
Treasurer of the Boston Central Labor Unioni and (6) a
representative of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce.
The Council had done its homework; they were out to per-
form their watchdog function. The questioning was vigor-
ous--especially from Councilor Foley. The President of the
Retail Trade Board cited the 1954 parking study, stating
that since then only 3,375 of the 12,000 needed spaces
had been built; and he erroneously claimed that the study
did not take into consideration the Central Artery. He
stated, "My feeling is that we need all the garages we
93. This was the only public hearing for which a stenogra-
phic record was available. Boston City Council, "Hear-
ing Before the Executive Committee re Acceptance of
Act Providing for the Construction and Operation of
Under-Common Garage," City Council Chamber, Boston,
Mass. First Day: November 22, 1957; Second Day:
November 27, 1957.
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can get." That seemed to summarize the arguments for
the Garage. The proponents were not sophisticated enough
in their analysis to distinguish locational advantages or
disadvantages.
Those appearing against the authority legisla-
tion included: (1) Representative William F. Otis (R)
from the Back Bay-Beacon Hill area; (2) Henry L. Shattuck,
former Representative and former City Councilor; (3) Charles
W. Eliot, a professional planner, appearing as Secretary
of the Boston Common Society; (4) Richard Waite, Beacon
Hill lawyer who had been counsel in litigation against the
Garage; (5) seven citizen representatives of the Beacon
Hill residential area; (6) William Stanley Parker, a pro-
fessional planner and member of the Planning Board from
1923 to 1948; (7) counsel for the Boston Elliot Street
Garage; (8) a representative of Motor Mart Garage; and
(9) James C. Bayley, State Representative from the Back
Bay District. The opponents cited the 1954 parking study
and the fact that the planning staff opposed the Garage.
They said that planners generally opposed it. The opposi-
tion of M.I.T. planning professor Burnham Kelly was also
cited; Kelly had testified against the Garage at an ear-
94. Ibid., November 22, 1957, p. 43.
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lier public hearing. They used every conceivable argu-
ment against the Garage and succeeded in their presenta-
tion. The Council was impressed by the opposition and did
not approve the legislation. The bill was also hindered
by an interest rate which was too low to sell bonds.
On the same day the Council had its first pub-
lic hearing, a bill to have a state public authority build
the Garage was filed. By spring 1958, it was involved
95
as part of a "package" of four public projects. The
package deal was the result of side payments necessary
to get projects through. The side payments were a means
of bringing diverse interests together for the achievement
of pet projects. A process of negotiation occurred by
which several parties were satisfied. The result: an
expenditure package. The package deal that developed in
1958 revolved around William F. Callahan, the powerful
Turnpike Authority Chairman. Callahan was influential
in the Legislature due to patronage debts built up while
Callahan was Commissioner of the State Department of Pub-
lic Works. He was a highway builder with a reputation
for getting things done. He seemed to be interested in
95. See James Q. Wilson, "An Overview of Theories of Planned
Change," in Robert Morris, ed., Centrally Planned Change:
Prospects and Concepts, New York: National Associa-
tion of Social Workers, 1964, p. 22.
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building personal power, as evidenced by this public works
package. He was Boston's counterpart to Robert Moses.
Others involved in the package were: (1) Robert B. Choate,
publisher of the Boston Herald; (2) Governor Furcolo; (3)
Anthony N. DiNatale, State Commissioner of Public Works;
and (4) Otis M. Whitney, State Commissioner of Public
Safety. Choate had been writing vituperative editorials
attacking Callahan. Suddenly, the editorials stopped when
this deal arose. Under the package deal agreement, the
96
following was to take place:
(1) The Turnpike Authority would be given vast
eminent domain powers necessary to extend the toll road
into Boston.
(2) Authorization to build a second harbor tun-
nel would be transferred from the Port Authority to the
Turnpike Authority.
(3) A Massachusetts Parking Authority would be
established to build the Boston Common Parking Garage.
(4) A three-member private corporation would
be set up to construct a new state office building.
Callahan was to be head of the Massachusetts
96. For a discussion of the package deal, see "Works
Package Tied to One-Man Power," The Christian Science
Monitor, May 15, 1958.
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Parking Authority and the state office building corpora-
tion. DiNatale and Whitney were also to be named to the
state office building corporation. Choate's interest was
not entirely clear, although he had long favored the Com-
mon Garage. His critics pointed to the fact that the Her-
ald owned property near the proposed Garage site, and that
Choate was having some difficulty retaining the license
for the Herald-Traveler owned television station (which
Callahan's political power could help save). The package
was balanced off against approval of an increased bond
rate for the Port Authority, a Republican-dominated pro-
ject created in 1956 but hindered by a low bond interest
rate.
The package deal actually went through. In the
first week of October, 1958, Governor Furcolo had all four
bills (each part of the package was a separate bill) be-
fore him for signing at one time. They were signed as a
package. And the Governor signed legislation upping the
Port Authority bond rate from 4 to 5 percent. By December,
Callahan was named Chairman of the Massachusetts Parking
Authority and was "elected" President of the Massachusetts
State Office Building Association. Otis M. Whitney be-
came Vice President of the office building corporation;
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and Anthony DiNatale became Treasurer and Clerk of the
Corporation. Other persons named to the Massachusetts
Parking Authority were George L. Brady, chief editorial
writer for the Hearst papers, and Frank R. Kelly, Boston
Park Commissioner. This package deal, in effect, made
the Garage a reality.
Personality difficulties arose in the Massachu-
setts Parking Authority. Callahan resigned claiming he
needed more time for his other responsibilities; and Kelly
resigned claiming conflict of interest due to his Park
Commission post. Brady became Chairman in June, 1959.
John Nuveen Co. agreed to underwrite $15 million in bonds.
Brady set the ground breaking for August 1, 1959. The
City Council was reluctant to give Brady the land; and
Park Commissioner Kelly expressed reservations about the
plans. As it turned out the Massachusetts Parking Auth-
ority had broader powers of eminent domain than most people
expected. On July 30, 1959, the Authority by-passed the
Council and Park Commission and took the Common land by
eminent domain. Members of the Beacon Hill Civic Associa-
tion, shaken by this land grab, went to court for an in-
junction and began circulating petitions for a popular
referendum on the Garage issue. The City Council refused
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to approve the land taking. On April 14, 1959, the Bea-
con Hill citizens presented their case in Suffolk Superior
Court. On August 20, they filed petitions before the City
Council signed by 162 people seeking a referendum. The
next day the Superior Court sent the case to the State
Supreme Judicial Court. In mid-September, Boston's Cor-
poration Counsel ruled that the referendum vote was not
required, and recommended to the Council that no action
be taken. In February, 1960, the Supreme Court ruled against
97
the plaintiffs. The Garage had financial backing and was
finally free of legal restrictions. Groundbreaking cere-
monies were held on March 3, 1960. The Garage opened for
business on November 18, 1961. During construction it
was discovered that the sacred Common had been used as a
dump in the nineteenth century. A scandal followed com-
pletion of the Garage. There had been corruption in the
handling of the Garage's construction. George Brady, the
enigmatic ex-Chairman, left town and has not been seen
since. The completed Garage has 1457 spaces; the total
cost was $9.6 million. The controversial vehicular tunnel
under the Public Garden was not built.
97. B. Earle Appleton et al. v. Massachusetts Parking
Authority, 340 Mass. 303.
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F. A HISTORICAL SUMMARY
To aid the reader in remembering the historical
sequence of the Garage's development, a brief historical
summary is listed below. This summary may be of assistance
in relating the historical decision to conclusions about
the tested hypotheses in the next section. The sequence
of events was:
1. First proposed--1919.
2. Advocated by various people--1923 to 1945.
3. City Planning Board not prepared to give advice--
1945, 1946.
4. Curley sponsored legislation authorizing private
construction passed; agreement with Motor Park,
Inc. -- July, 1946.
5. Garage tied up in court--1946 to 1948.
6. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld Ga-
rage legislation--May, 1948.
7. Garage made tax exempt--June, 1948.
8. U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider case--Octo-
ber , 1948.
9. Difficulty in getting financial backing--1948
through 1950.
10. Mayor Hynes committed to Garage--1950.
11. RFC loan approval obtained--July, 1950.
12. RFC loan application rejected--April, 1951.
13. Insurance companies permitted to invest in Garage--
June, 1951.
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14. More extensions to Motor Park, Inc.--1951 to
December, 1953.
15. Planning Board reverses staff study recommendation--
February, 1955.
16. Public authority legislation defeated; John Fox
claimed construction to begin right away--June,
1955.
17. Contract between City and Motor Park, Inc. signed--
November, 1955.
18. Superior court ruled Garage must be "under Boston
Common"--December, 1955.
19. New plans calling for fewer cars introduced-Febru-
ary, 1956.
20. U.S. Supreme Court dismissed tax exemption case--
June, 1957.
21. Legislation passed authorizing public authority
to be established by the City--September, 1957.
22. Package deal approved; state authority to build
Garage -- October, 1958.
23. Land taken by Massachusetts Parking Authority--
July, 1959.
24. Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld taking--Febru-
ary, 1960.
25. Groundbreaking--March, 1960.
26. Opened for business--November, 1961.
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III. CO NCLUS IONS
A. HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS
In drawing conclusions about the hypotheses of
the study, emphasis will be given to the stance taken by
city planners during 1954 and 1955. It was during these
years that the planners were most involved and that their
position was most clear. Also, the more recent date (as
opposed to 1946) is probably closer to the societal con-
ditions of planning today. Thus the findings related to
1954-55 may be more relevant in trying to clarify the plan-
ner's role. In order to focus upon the findings vis a vis
the hypotheses, each hypothesis will be considered sepa-
rately. An attempt will be made to combine these findings
into more general observations about the planner's role,
in the next section.
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Hypothesis 1: The planner's influence will be
determined by the appropriateness of his role to the deci-
sion-making environment in which he 2perates.
As was pointed out earlier, the planners played
a Technical role. Boston's political decision-making en-
vironment was essentially competitive. Two studies of
Boston politics suggest a competitive system of actors or
groups vying for influence in matters that pertain to them.9 8
Norton Long has described it as an ecology of games. A
number of people or organizations are potentially influen-
tial in Boston. They include: (1) business interests;
(2) newspapers; (3) labor unions; (4) civic groups; and
(5) political personalities. The list of all actors in
the system is much longer. In the Boston Common Garage
history, the proponents included a formidable coalition of
community influentials. The Garage was supported by down-
town merchants, civic groups, labor unions, the press,
and important politicians. The only real opposition came
from Beacon Hill and Back Bay residents, the old Yankee
stock. It can be said that the planner in his technical
98. Banfield and Derthrick, ed., op. cit.; and Norton E.
Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games,"
American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (1958), pp. 251-
261.
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role was not influential. The Common Garage case sustains
Rabinowitz's finding.99 To have been influential, the
planner should probably have been a "Broker". If planning
director McCormick had been more aggressive, he might have
become the Mayor's right hand man. In the early 1950's,
Mayor Hynes could have relied upon technical arguments
provided by the planning staff. Together with the plan-
ning director they might have persuaded the downtown mer-
chants that the Garage was not feasible. Planning could
have served to free Mayor Hynes from a burdensome commit-
ment. As it was, the planner's advice came too late and
was destined to be ignored. The frustration experienced
by the planning staff was the result of the subservient
technical role. Leaks to the newspaper represented an
attempt to break away from the suffocating relationship
between the Planning Board and staff. The sense of accom-
plishment that McCormick experienced during Curley's ad-
ministration points to what Rabinowitz found. The tech-
nician role may yield results when an elite power struc-
ture exists. Curley was a powerful, political boss. He
was not as restrained in his use of planning as was Mayor
99. Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 153-161.
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Hynes.
The technical role was not totally ineffective,
in that the parking study served as the basis for parking
facilities built by the City. Today, many of the sites
recommended by Davidson are occupied by municipal parking
garages. But if the planning director had assumed a differ-
ent role, the planner's advice might also have been influ-
ential in the Common Garage decision. Whether or not the
reaction of the staff by resigning was better in terms of
planning influence is probably a moot question. They had
achieved a certain amount of alleviation by leaking news.
If they had remained, instead of resigning, they might have
eventually succeeded in gaining greater acceptance of plan-
ning. Success was not assured, though; and their devious
means of influence might have only increased misunderstand-
ing between the Board and staff. In any case, remaining
to fight a slow battle would have been a difficult and
probably unnerving position for anyone to assume. During
1956, when eight members of the staff resigned, the con-
sultant's recommendations really sank in. The Board was
not entirely insensitive to employee needs. The Board
had previously ignored low salary rates and had expressed
the provincial desire to hire local people. From a low
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point in 1956, the Board responded to the resignations and
consultant report by hiring a new planning director from
Providence. McCormick remained, but was forced into sec-
ond position. Today, city planning is a vital part of the
Mayor's program. Boston's urban renewal program, under
Mayor John F. Collins and administrator Edward Logue, has
made remarkable achievements. This increased acceptance
of planning may have been the result of federal stimula-
tion, or a changing attitude toward the public interest by
Bostonians rising into the middle class.1 0 0 Or it may have
resulted in part from the planning staff's refusal in 1956
to play a subordinate, passive role.
Hypothesis 2: City planners, working for govern-
ment agencies, will tend to favor government measures over
private action.
There is some evidence to support this hypothesis,
101
although it is not conclusive. Neither McCormick nor
the consultant, Howard, expressed any bias toward public
construction of the Garage. They simply opposed it, pri-
100. According to Banfield and Wilson's analysis of city
politics, as people move into the middle class, they
will tend to take on a public-regarding view. See
Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., Conclusion, pp. 329-346.
101. Data for this hypothesis is drawn from interviews.
__14
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vate or public. Their lack of bias may be explained by
the fact that McCormick was not very much involved when
the Garage issue arose in 1954, and that Howard was a con-
sultant from the outside. Howard had attachments to two
private organizations--M.I.T. and the consulting firm,
Adams, Howard, & Greeley. The one planner who showed
some bias against private action was Davidson, the plan-
ner most involved in the issue. In an interview, David-
son stated that he might have favored the Garage if it had
not cost so much. In addition to the reasons against the
Garage listed in the parking study, Davidson said he was
also against it because he did not consider it a wise in-
vestment of city funds at that time. His work on the capi-
102
tal improvement program no doubt influenced his opinion.
But since it appeared the Garage would be built anyway, he
was opposed to private construction. He felt they would
try to cut costs in every way, leading to a bad facility.
And he firmly opposed private construction because he said
the private concerns wanted to build it on top of the Common.
This was actually a misinterpretation of the- private view.
At no time after the 1946 legislation was passed did Motor
Park, Inc. attempt to build it on top of the Common. The
102. Boston City Planning Board, Capital Iprovement Pro-
gram 1954-1959. Boston: January, 1954.
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1946 law specifically called for the Garage to be under the
Common. Davidson's opinion does not definitely support
the hypothesis. The opinion was expressed almost ten years
after his involvement in the Garage debate. But distrust
and misinterpretation of the private sector was expressed.
This view might have been different, however, had the plan-
ning staff been able to play a more positive role in coor-
dinating physical development decisions in the City.
Hypothesis 3: In a location dispute, the plan-
ning expert serves as a co-opted intermediary to plead
the case of a particular interest or to legitimate the
plans of a political head.
Hypothesis 3a: Studies provided by planners are
used to draw pressure or criticism away from the political
head.
Neither of these hypotheses were valid in the
Boston Common Garage case. The planners were not co-opted
by anyone. They may have been influenced by William Stan-
ley Parker, the former Chairman of the Planning Board. And
the parking study was used in arguments by both the oppo-
nents and proponents of the Garage. In particular, the
opponents were able to exploit the staff's disagreement
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with the Board. But in no real sense was the planning staff
co-opted; they remained largely independent of interest
group pressures. Their position certainly did not legi-
timate Mayor Hynes' case for the Garage; in fact they prob-
ably caused the Mayor some embarrassment. The parking
study did not draw any pressure or criticism away from
the Mayor, although Mayor Hynes could have conceivably
used it to change his position. To have allowed themselves
to be co-opted might have increased the planners' influ-
ence. In being outside the political struggle, the planners'
technical rationality was maintained. The planning staff,
however, apparently wanted to pursue a more active role.
But due to the constraints upon them, neither were they
able to assert themselves effectively nor did any of the
main political actors actually seek to co-opt them.
Hypothesis 4: A political decision-maker can
never make an important location decision on completely
rational grounds. To some degree, he will have to be ar-
bitrary or nonlogical. Thus expert opinion will have to
be compromised.
This hypothesis was certainly true from the city
planner's view. Mayor Hynes completely ignored the ration-
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al bases for locating parking facilities, when it came
to the Common Garage. The expert opinion of the planning
staff was compromised for the Common Garage, but not for
the smaller municipal garage facilities. Hynes wanted
some kind of support from the Planning Board on the Com-
mon Garage issue. Through Chairman McDonough he obtained
the Board's approval of the Garage and the pending legis-
lation. Compromising the staff's recommendation was nec-
essary from Hynes' viewpoint. The reference in the hypo-
thesis is to technical rationality, which Hynes did not
display. But from a different view, Hynes was probably
rational. He had to weigh the risk of alienating the down-
town interests against allowing the planning staff's recom-
mendation to stand or against following the staff's tech-
nical rationality. The political pressure favoring the
Garage was strong; and 1955 was an election year. Hynes'
job was at stake. It was rational for him to want to be
re-elected. In this view, then, Hynes took the logical
step of compromising the planning staff's advice. The
planning staff probably did not appreciate his delicate
position. If they had, resentment because of the report
change would not have been so great.
Hypothesis 5: The planning expert will be sys-
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tematically biased in his choice of positions in a location
dispute. He will favor tangible, quantifiable, predictable
criteria of choice.
The reasons against the Garage as given by the
planning staff in the parking study report were: (1) close-
ness to an area well served by existing garages; (2) dis-
tance from the major retail area; (3) garages nearer the
retail area would provide better service; and (4) high
cost. All of these arguments were quantifiable. The park-
ing study provided actual data on how well sub-areas of
the CBD were served. The Common Garage distance was well
over the 400 feet walking distance from the retail area.
Other garages could have provided better service because
they would have been where the predictable, quantifiable
demand was. And the Common Garage plans at that time
would have required costs of about $5,000 per space (ac-
cording to some estimates) compared with $3,100 per space
at the sites recommended by the planning staff. All of
these criteria were tangible. Cost and parking demand
were predictable. The planners did not account for such
intangibles as providing a symbol for the downtown's re-
vival, or enhancing Boston's prestige with a grandiose
project. The planners' main data was current and projected
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parking demand. Thus the planners' criteria in advising
against the Garage substantiated the hypothesis. The plan-
ners were in fact systematically biased in their position.
The orderly, logical way to select parking sites was to
collect facts consistent with rational rules of thought.
Quantifying and projecting information were the correct
ways to satisfy rational criteria of choice. The Techni-
cal role was buttressed by a technician's bias.
Hypothesis 6: The rationality, public welfare,
and synoptic orientations of city planners will cause them
to conflict with political leaders whose orientations are
more incremental and disjointed.
Hypothesis 6a: The preference of city planners
for abstract programming criteria will place them at lo-
gerheads with the City Council which has a more "political"
perspective.
The first hypothesis was supported by the histori-
cal data. The planners' simple criteria and the compre-
hensive study of downtown parking demand were not adequate
for the Mayor. The rational-deductive ideal could not be
accepted by the Mayor as the basis for policy toward the
Common Garage. The cost (time and money) of information
- - - A-n on1L=eeeKim moolo 1111m 1 11m  il 1 -- -1 li- -
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was not great in 1954-55; but it was a factor in the Board's
inability to express an informed opinion in 1946. The pub-
lic welfare orientation of efficiency and impartiality in
government (the public-regarding view) that the planners
used in 1954-55 led to conflict with the Mayor's view.
Mayor Hynes had to reject the planners' orientation. His
orientation was incremental (win re-election) and disjointed
(only the Common Garage need be considered at that time;
no need for coordination with other city projects). The
planners' orientation did not, however, conflict with all
political views. The planners' view met the same rejec-
tion by the Council during the first part of the Hynes
administration (1950-56), while the Council largely backed
the Mayor. But during the latter part (1957-60), the Coun-
cil assumed more of a watchdog function. During that time,
the Council accepted the abstract programming criteria as
a good basis for criticizing the Mayor's legislation. It
should be pointed out also that the Council had virtually
no power in the Common Garage debate until they were re-
quired to approve the 1957 public authority legislation.
Prior to then the planners and the Council were not at
loggerheads because neither had much influence. The fact
that the Council was elected at large may have forced upon
r-88-
them a more public-regarding view. The Council members
had no wards to please. The Common Garage could not get
any one Councilor more votes. The Council was "nonpoli-
tical" in that sense; it differed from the Philadelphia
ward-elected Council upon which the hypothesis had been
based.103 Thus in Boston, abstract programming criteria
did not lead to conflict between the planners and the City
Council.
Hypothesis 7: The planner will want stability
in capital programming. This will lead to conflict with
the politician's view of municipal policy which favors
government responsiveness to short-run ublic wants.
Stability in capital programming was illustrated
by the timing sequence proposed in the parking study.104
It called for an average construction rate of 1,000 spaces
per year for ten years, with a higher rate in the initial
years and a lower rate in the later years. The staff had
also prepared a capital improvement program for the years
1954-59.105 The Common Garage was not mentioned in the
103. Brown and Gilbert, op. cit.
104. Boston City Planning Toard, A Parking Program For The
Boston Central Business Area, op. cit., p. 11.
105. Boston City Planning Board, Capital Improvement Pro-
ctram19_54-59, op. cit.
i
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program. This was probably due to the fact that private
financing of the Garage was expected. Davidson's opposi-
tion to the Garage was based partly on the fact that he
did not think it would be a good investment, given the
state of City finances. In an interview, Howard stated
that he favored a stable program, but not at the expense
of needed action. McCormick also favored a stable approach
to programming. Thus the planners favored stability. But
did this lead to conflict with the politician's view of
municipal policy, as suggested in the hypothesis?
Yes it did. But due to the planning staff's
weak influence, the conflict was not serious. The poli-
tician's view easily predominated. The response to short-
run public pressure came from the Mayor and the State Leg-
islature. There was no conflict with the City Council's
view because it had assumed a kind of nonpolitical role;
and it had no real power to meet the pressure (which was
not directed at the Council anyway). The city councilor's
view thus was distinct from the politician's view presented
in the hypothesis. If construction of the Common Garage
had been dependent upon inclusion in a stable capital im-
provement program, it is doubtful that the Garage would
ever have been built. The Garage was possible because
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political responses were made to short-run public wants.
The main political response was made in 1946. Then after
it was clear that private financing could not build the
Garage, the separate public authority became the immediate
panacea. Both in 1946 and in the years 1957-58, the poli-
tical response was to strong pressure. A stable program-
ming budget could not have met this short-run demand.
Hypothesis 8: When giving locational advice
for projects proposed by other governmental agencies, if
the proposed projects require user-demand forecasting,
city planners will favor a large number of small projects
over a small number of large projects of equal cost.
Consider the Common Garage as the executive of-
fice's (the Mayor's) proposal. The planning staff's ad-
vice against the Common Garage was based upon parking de-
mand forecasts; they favored a series of smaller garages
to the huge Common Garage. The costs were to be roughly
equal (10 to 13 million dollars). Thus the hypothesis is
valid. The preference for smaller projects derives from
the analytical technique. It is technically rational to
locate facilities convenient to the persons who will use
them. The parking study was based upon data collected
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for sub-districts of the CBD. The existing and projected
demand for on-street and off-street parking spaces was
shown for each sub-district. Sites were then selected
to satisfy each sub-district's demand. The concept used
was similar to that of the service district used in deter-
mining school, hospital, fire station, police station, and
playground locations. The method precludes a giant, cen-
tral facility to serve everyone. Convenience is enhanced
by having dispersed facilities. This is not necessarily
bad, except that it neglects proper consideration of as-
pects other than convenience. For example, could a giant
parking facility introduce economies of scale? Could it
make possible the provision of special services to the
parker? Could it actually help the searching parker by
giving him only one choice? Could it give the downtown
a new attraction? These and probably other considerations
tend to be omitted by the demand-convenience method of
study. City planners should be aware of this methodo-
logical bias; it limits their range of analysis.
B. THE PLANNER AS PRIVATE CITIZEN
Part of the opposition to the Common Garage came
from city planners who acted as private citizens. They
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were not employed by the City of Boston. This group in-
cluded: (1) William Stanley Parker; (2) Charles Eliot;
and (3) Burnham Kelly. The first two were semi-organized
in their efforts; whereas Kelly testified (1955) against
the Garage independently. Parker had opposed the Garage
since 1946. Charles Eliot was a member of the Boston Com-
mon Society and had inherited the role of antagonist from
his father. When Eliot returned to Boston from California
in 1954, he tried to organize the planners in opposition.
Parker maintained a home on Beacon Hill, and thus was iden-
tified with the Beacon Hill interests. The other planners
were not so closely attached to Beacon Hill, although they
supported the Beacon Hill people.
The above planners' opposition was significant.
For one, they lent the legitimacy of professional status
to the Yankee cause. Arguments generated by the planners
were significant in the City Council's failure to approve
the 1957 public authority legislation. Second, William
Stanley Parker was successful in obtaining an entrance and
exit parallel to Charles Street. And third, combined with
the Beacon Hill-Back Bay opposition they were influential
in preventing construction of the vehicular tunnel under
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the Public Garden (the 1958 law authorized construction
of the tunnel; but it has not been built).
The planners were of the public-regarding tra-
dition; and their opposition to the Garage was probably
consistent with their professional bias, the preservation
of open space.106 The significance of their role was two-
fold: (1) professional status was given to pressure group
arguments; and (2) the planner was acting as a member of
the local community. These two aspects of the planner's
role are often ignored. The first suggests that the plan-
ner can serve as an agent of political pressure from the
outside, in addition to influencing decisions as an employ-
ee of local government. The importance of identifying
this pressure group role of the planner is that it shows
that the planner can be influential in political decision-
making, even when planning is ignored internally by city
officials. When one speaks of the planner being intimately
involved in politics,107 the perspective should include
private as well as public involvement. But public and
private involvement also introduces the problem of planners
106. William L. C. Wheaton, "Operations Research For Met-
ropolitan Planning," Journal of the American Insti-
tute of Planners, XXIX (November, 1963), p. 254.
107. See Norton E. Long, "Planning and Politics in Urban
Development," Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, XXV (November, 1959), pp. 167-169.
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disagreeing. In the Common Garage case, the planners
were all agreed. They were able to put up a united front
of professional opinion against the Garage.108 The plan-
ners working for the City of Boston and private plan-
ners complemented each other. But what if another group
of planners had favored the Garage? They could have intro-
duced professional arguments to support it. If this had
occurred, the conflict of expert opinion probably would
have nullified the planner's influence. Both sides of
109
the debate would have had supporting professional opinion.
108. One private planner, Sidney N. Shurcliff, refused
to join in opposing the Garage. He held back on
his opinion until after a report on the proposed
Garage had been prepared for the Beacon Hill Civic
Association. (See Philip W. Bourne, "The Proposed
Underground Garage For The Parking of Motor Vehicles
Under Boston Common, And Its Effect Upon The Beacon
Hill District," November, 1955.) Shurcliff was in-
strumental in having the Beacon Hill Civic Associa-
tion (of which he was a member) authorize preparation
of the report. The report concluded that the Garage
was not needed as much as strategically located
facilities; but it suggested that the Garage might
be desirable if parking demand exceeded the Plan-
ning Board's estimates. In an interview, Shurcliff
revealed that the Beacon Hill Civic Association,
after considering the report, voted 110-11 to oppose
the Common Garage. Shurcliff was one of the eleven
dissenters. Although he may not have opposed the
Garage, Shurcliff did not actively support it. Thus
the other planners who opposed it were able to put
up a united front.
109. This is possible. See Dennis O'Harrow, "The Expert
Witness," ASPO Newsletter, Vol. 29, No. 11 (December,
1963), pp. 121-122.
r
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A hypothesis suggested by the Common Garage history is:
Hypothesis: When all participant city planners
favor one side in a location dispute, they may serve as an
important, private, pressure-group influence. But if plan-
ners disagree and take different sides in the debate, their
influence as private citizens will be nullified.
The second aspect of the planner's role as pri-
vate citizen, his action as a member identified with the
local community, should be emphasized. The two semi-or-
ganized, private planners who opposed the Garage were and
have remained residents of the Boston area. They sincerely
felt that the Garage would disrupt an irreplaceable, public
park. Their strong concern was based upon their attach-
ment to and identification with the City of Boston. It
is difficult to imagine this kind of concern coming from
itinerant, job-hopping planners. And the fact that the
Boston planners were continuous opponents over the years
no doubt increased their influence. A hypothesis drawn
from the Common Garage dispute then is:
Hypothesis: Movement of city planners from com-
munity to community reduces their influence as private
citizens in the local political arena.
That planners should have political know-how is
-- I
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110
an old maxim. But most planners have not entered the
profession to participate in the great game of politics. il
To suggest that they be politically active as private citi-
zens may be asking too much. One conclusion of this study,
however, is that one of the best ways for the city planner
to be influential in local governmental decision-making
is to exercise his rights as a private citizen. The plan-
ner should not be restricted to influence within a govern-
mental agency. If the planner is seriously interested in
influencing physical development decisions in the urban
environment, he has a private role as well as a public role
to perform. The private role may be restricted, however,
to communities where the planner is not publicly employed.
110. See John T. Howard, "Political Education For Planners,"
Planning 1948. Chicago: American Society of Plan-
ning Officials, 1948, pp. 168-171.
111. See Daland and Parker, op. cit., p. 201.
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IV. IMPLI CATIONS A N D S U G G E S T E D
F U R T H E R R E S E A R C H
In reviewing the Garage's history and the results
of hypothesis testing, a number of more general observa-
tions can be made. These observations will relate the find-
ings of the study to its purpose of clarifying the planne's
role. They suggest implications for the planner's beha-
vior in a political environment.
One observation based on the study is that the
planner should be able to adjust to changing political
environments over time. The political conditions for plan-
ning can change significantly in short periods of time.
For instance, the shift in the Mayor's office from Curley
to Hynes brought a reduction in communication flow between
the planning director and the Mayor. The Technical role
under Mayor Curley was satisfactory to the planning staff
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because Curley was interested in getting their advice on
certain matters. But Mayor Hynes soon became indifferent
to planning. The planning director did not develop close
ties with him. For Curley, planning was "useful"; for
Hynes it was not. Both Mayors ignored the planners in
the Common Garage debate. But in 1946, there was no feel-
ing of frustration on the part of the staff or Planning
Board because they had no timely advice to give. By 1954,
the Mayor was committed to the Garage. The planners could
not have been influential with the Mayor at that late date.
Their advice against the Garage was poorly timed. It came
long after the Garage had become a symbol of downtown re-
vival. A different role by the planners probably could
have influenced Mayor Hynes earlier in his administration;
but instead the planners found themselves playing a role
carried forward from a different political climate.
A second observation is that the planner should
be prepared for crisis situations. One way to be influ-
ential is to have planning advice ready when it is needed
or when a decision is about to be made. The planning agen-
cy was ill-prepared for the political pressure generated
by the post-war traffic increase. Their opinion toward
the Garage could have been formulated in the early 1940's.
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Although Mayor Curley might have ignored the Planning
Board and staff anyway, they were nevertheless in no posi-
tion to exert any influence. There was no time for a
"scientific study." The planning staff should have been
ready to show where parking facilities were needed, say,
during 1945 when the Garage proposal was starting to gain
serious attention. Instead, the planner's opinion came
out ten years later. This was long after a political re-
sponse to the crisis had been made. The Garage was al-
ways a possibility in the 1950's because the 1946 legis-
lation had been passed.
The dangers inherent in planning methods have
also been revealed in this study. The desire for stabil-
ity, the use of quantification, and user-demand techniques
may be "rational" in preventing drastic, stupid projects.
But they may also unduly restrain the possibilities of the
112
political system. The hard headed, defensible techniques
of planning may conservatively bias the system against
large, abrupt, emotion-laden, although interesting changes.
One of the classical roles of the planner has been to in-
ject the longer view, the somewhat utopian frame, into the
112. For a discussion of technical, general-evaluative,
and general-inventive rationality in public-service
professions, see Alan Altshuler, "Reason and Influ-
ence in the Public Service," Manuscript, 1965.
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decision-making environment. The planner favors long-run
and medium-run changes in the future. He should be aware,
however, that there is always the possibility for physi-
cal change in the immediate future. And the techniques
of the planner's public-regarding rationality should also
recognize the need for spontaniety and creativity in the
short-run.
This case study has shown the dilemma of the
planner seeking to be rational yet influential. The study
has indicated that different roles may be appropriate un-
der different conditions. The planner must be politically
sensitive, yet technically competent. It is reasonable
for the planner to want greater influence. With the in-
creased acceptance of the public-regarding tradition, it
is the city planner who will be able to articulate city-
wide interests. In doing so, he may become an important
figure in the political arena. To shy away from politics
113
would be to miss his real potential.
Additional case studies would be useful in fur-
ther clarifying the planner's role. Research is also
needed to discover the planner's attitudes and professional
113. See Robert C. Wood, "Urban Regions: The Challenges
and Achievements in Public Administration," Plan-
ning 1962. Chicago: American Society of Planning
Officials, 1962, pp. 5-11.
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motivations. More comparative studies of the planning ex-
pert's role in a variety of political conditions could be
meaningful. The degree to which identification with a
governmental agency affects the planner's behavior might
be examined more closely. And finally, some attempt to
reconcile planning theory to the realities of politics
should be attempted.
-102-
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